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CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER? 
YES—A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND RACIAL ALIENATION FROM 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS 
MICHAEL DEHAVEN NEWSOM* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The nomination of Clarence Thomas as an Associate Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court unhinged many African-Americans, including this 
writer.  Many simply had no idea of what to make of a situation that involved 
the combustible mixture of gender, race, class, political duplicity, political 
ideology, and alleged sexual harassment, nor of the African-American man 
who sat at the center of the maelstrom.  Valiant attempts, however, were made 
to sort out the issues raised by President Bush’s cynical decision to offer up 
Clarence Thomas as “the best person for [the] position”1 vacated by retirement 
of Thurgood Marshall.2  But sorting out and settling are two rather different 
things.  Clarence Thomas continues to be a thorn in the side of many African-
Americans and the storm has not subsided.  This paper will attempt to explain 
why Justice Thomas writes opinions and casts votes on the Court that continue 
 
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. 
 1. The Supreme Court: A Nominee is Presented, Excerpts From News Conference 
Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES NAT’L, July 2, 1991, at A14 (statement of President 
Bush).  “Certainly Bush was exaggerating.”  Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The 
Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 120 (1993).  Wells argues that Thomas was not, however, 
an affirmative action appointment.  See id. at 121–22 (arguing that “[t]here are two reasons, 
however, why it makes sense to believe that Thomas was not an affirmative action appointment 
and that Bush was not trying to maintain diversity on the Court by appointing the ‘best-qualified 
Black,’” because “the claim that Thomas is the best-qualified Black is so clearly false that it could 
not be credited except in the presence of some exceedingly negative stereotypes about Black 
people and their achievements,” and because “Bush has consistently demonstrated in real and 
concrete terms that he is not the sort of man who places a positive value on diversifying American 
political life” given “[h]is repeated opposition to civil rights legislation and the employment 
practices of his own administration [as] strong evidence that George Bush is sincerely and firmly 
opposed to affirmative action in all its forms”). 
 2. See RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS 
HEARINGS (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995); AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 
SPEAK OUT ON ANITA HILL-CLARENCE THOMAS (Geneva Smitherman ed., 1995); RACE-ING 
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). 
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to bother, frustrate, annoy, and exasperate many African-Americans.  It is the 
thesis of this paper that Clarence Thomas is deeply alienated from most 
African-Americans, and his alienation largely operates to repudiate, disavow, 
and otherwise insult African-Americans, a fact of which many whites are not 
aware.3  This paper also suggests that Thomas’s victimizing alienation is 
perfectly suited for a high court bent, unfortunately, on maintaining white 
hegemony. 
Felix Geyer tells us that “[a]lienation is a venerable concept, with its roots 
going back some two millennia.” 4  Its modern meanings might trace their 
origins to the works of Karl Marx,5 but others would also point to Sigmund 
Freud and psychoanalysis.6  In addition, the experiences of African-Americans 
and other people of color have led to yet another school of thought on the 
subject of alienation.7  While there are thus several different perspectives or 
analytical frameworks within which one can think about the concept of 
alienation, some generalizations are possible.  Alienation has six dimensions: 
powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, self-
estrangement, and cultural estrangement.8  All six are aspects of distance or 
separation.  William Monroe writes: 
Alienation implies dissatisfaction, discontent, boredom . . . the desire to be 
elsewhere.  Though the reasons may be vague, the conviction is clear and 
sharp: the here-and-now is not good enough.  At its most subversive, the call of 
alienation emanates from a transcendent realm beyond historicity or originates 
 
 3. See John O. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks—From 
Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five,” 46 HOW. L.J. 175, 181 (2003) (stating that he 
“think[s] that whites generally have no idea of the intensity of black negative feelings toward 
Justice Thomas”).  Professor Calmore’s article shares many of the themes and modalities of this 
essay.  See id.  His main purpose, however is to connect Justice Thomas’s alienation to a need for 
“linking critical race theory to a critical pedagogy that helps to re-socialize law students and 
orient them toward a critical race practice.”  Id. at 183.  The purpose of the present essay is to 
explore the nature and dimensions of that alienation and to suggest that Thomas is as much a 
victimizer as he is a victim of racial oppression.  See infra note 24.  As such, the purpose of the 
present essay is to sound the tocsin, to warn, to alert, and to argue that Justice Thomas’s 
victimizing alienation advances the true goals and objectives of the United States Supreme Court, 
goals and objectives that must change if righteousness shall fall like the rain and justice move like 
that rolling river.  And yet, our purposes ultimately come together; perhaps re-socializing law 
students will produce lawyers, legislators and opinion leaders who will seek to reorient, if not 
change, the goals and objectives of the Supreme Court, for change is surely needed. 
 4. Felix Geyer, Introduction: Alienation, Ethnicity, and Postmodernism, in ALIENATION, 
ETHNICITY, AND POSTMODERNISM ix, xi (Felix Geyer ed., 1996). 
 5. Richard Schmitt, Introduction: Why is the Concept of Alienation Important?, in 
ALIENATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 1–6 (Richard Schmitt & Thomas E. Moody eds., 1994). 
 6. See Geyer, supra note 4, at ix–x, xi, xiii. 
 7. Howard McGary, Alienation and the African-American Experience, in ALIENATION AND 
SOCIAL CRITICISM, supra note 5, at 133–35. 
 8. Geyer, supra note 4, at ix. 
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in a consciousness superior to the encultured self.  While the modes or 
strategies of alienation are many, they all seem to share the conviction that 
persons and communities have become estranged from their true destiny or 
potential.  Thus the sulky signs of alienation often imply an intense but diffuse 
accusation.9 
Alienation is necessarily a relational concept; it stems from the lack of a 
proper balance between individuals and social groups, settings or contexts.10  It 
is a product of the man-made world.11  As a consequence, alienation is not 
“monolithic; . . . in fact, no one is simply alienated, but persons are alienated in 
specific respects and may thus be suffering alienation in some contexts of their 
lives and be inflicting alienation in other contexts.”12  Suffering alienation may 
even yield a social good because alienation can be a “functional response[] to 
dysfunctional cultural situations.”13  More precisely, “[a]lienation is 
inseparable from function and even contributes, in its fashion, to healthy 
function.”14  Nonetheless, while alienation might validate liberty,15 “many of 
our strategies of alienation have denatured themselves by adopting methods of 
coercion, gestures of intimidation, and rubrics of violence,”16 the antithesis of 
freedom.  One cannot easily map the social value or utility of alienation as an 
abstract proposition; much depends on particular or specific facts or context. 
The final point to bear in mind is Howard McGary’s claim that African-
Americans, as a group, are not “alienated or estranged from themselves.”17  
This proposition seems counterintuitive, given the conventional wisdom that 
holds that African-Americans frequently cannot trust, or do not trust, each 
 
 9. WILLIAM MONROE, POWER TO HURT: THE VIRTUES OF ALIENATION 5 (1998) (alteration 
in original) (footnote omitted). 
 10. See Roy S. Bryce-Laporte & Claudewell S. Thomas, Epilogue to ALIENATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXAMINATION 382, 385–86 (Roy S. Bryce-
Laporte & Claudewell S. Thomas eds., 1976) (arguing that individuals must enjoy a sense of 
belonging and feel a sense of belonging to the social organizations of which they are members 
while at the same time these organizations must concede individual rights and provide “adequate 
services, equal protection, promised opportunities, and just rewards”). 
 11. Felix Geyer & Walter R. Heinz, Introduction to ALIENATION SOCIETY AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, at xi, xxxii (Felix Geyer & 
Walter R. Heinz eds., 1992). 
 12. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 18.  See also Geyer & Heinz, supra note 11, at xxxii 
(stating that “[t]he alienated have automatically been viewed as the victims; but some of them at 
least may also be the perpetrators” and thus “[m]ore emphasis should be placed on investigating 
how precisely those who are alienated may further the continued existence of alienating 
conditions on all levls [sic] of social reproduction”). 
 13. MONROE, supra note 9, at 7. 
 14. Id. at 210. 
 15. Id. at 211. 
 16. Id. 
 17. McGary, supra note 7, at 142. 
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other.18  McGary puts his claim in context, however.  First, he concedes that 
some African-Americans have experienced such alienation.19  Indeed, the 
thesis here is that Clarence Thomas is precisely such an African-American.  
Nonetheless, McGary contends: 
[Lack of recognition of blacks by whites in American society] does not always 
lead to alienation.  Even though African-Americans have experienced hostility, 
racial discrimination, and poverty, they still have been able to construct and 
draw upon institutions like the family, church, and black community to foster 
and maintain a healthy sense of self in spite of the obstacles that they have 
faced.20 
He presses the point, rejecting the central claim of many who seek to 
understand alienation through the prism of the experience of oppressed racial 
minorities.21 
This . . . is not to say that these [African-American] communities provide their 
members with all that is necessary for them to flourish under conditions of 
justice, but only that they provide enough support to create the space necessary 
for them to avoid the deeply divided and estranged selves described in some 
recent work on alienation.22 
He concludes: “I don’t deny that a hostile racist society creates the kind of 
assault that can lead to alienation, but only that this assault can be and has been 
softened by supportive African-American communities.”23  McGary argues, 
therefore, for the critical importance of community in assessing whether or not 
African-Americans, generally, are estranged from other blacks, while at the 
same time recognizing that such estrangement can and does occur. 
In light of the foregoing, the thesis of this paper, restated, is that for 
whatever reason or reasons, Clarence Thomas is estranged and socially isolated 
from African-Americans as a group.  It is also the thesis of this paper that 
Clarence Thomas’s alienation finds powerful expression in the utter lack of 
African-American institutional or community support for his views on race and 
the votes that he casts on the Court in furtherance thereof.24  To the contrary, 
 
 18. One finds powerful expression of this idea in literature.  See generally LORRAINE 
HANSBERRY, A RAISIN IN THE SUN (1959) (describing that the son of the heroine is conned by 
another African-American out of the insurance money that was to fund a move by his family from 
the Chicago ghetto to a formerly all-white neighborhood). 
 19. McGary, supra note 7, at 142. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 22. McGary, supra note 7, at 142. 
 23. Id. at 142–43. 
 24. It is also the thesis of this writer that whether or not Clarence Thomas is a victim by 
virtue of his alienation, he is surely a perpetrator, victimizing African-Americans by way of the 
votes that he casts on the Court.  The proper proof of this proposition, which requires a careful 
reading and analysis of scores of opinions, is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, one need 
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the only institutional or community support that Clarence Thomas has comes 
from reactionary whites,25 particularly those who see the Supreme Court as the 
defender of white hegemony. 
This paper will explore Clarence Thomas’s alienation from black people 
from a variety of perspectives, each of which points in the same direction.  Part 
II will examine two competing macro-narratives that frame the tension 
between Clarence Thomas and a substantial majority of African-Americans. 26  
The first of them, the “Civil Rights Macro-Narrative,” received definitive 
treatment at the hands of A. Leon Higginbotham, a distinguished American 
 
only consider Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), in which Thomas joined four other Justices on 
the Court in electing George Bush president of the United States, notwithstanding the salient fact 
that more than ninety percent of African-American voters supported a different candidate, the one 
who actually won the popular vote, on the basis of votes cast or attempted to be cast by the lowly 
American people.  See Jamin B. Raskin, What’s Wrong with Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to 
Amend the Constitution to Ensure it Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652, 702 (2002).  If 
one takes into account the chicanery involved in disenfranchising African-Americans in Florida, 
see Raskin, supra at 202–03, and the incredible snafus in ballot design and defective voting 
machines, see Jon L. Mills, Florida on Trial: Federalism in the 2000 Presidential Election, 13 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85 (2002), Gore carried the State of Florida in the 2000 presidential 
election.  This writer assumes that the African-American community as a whole knew which 
major-party candidate would further its interests and which one would not.  One cannot easily 
dismiss a vote this lopsided as the product of dementia, delusion, or ignorance. 
  It is certainly true that anybody who voted for Gore was victimized by the Court’s coup 
d’état, and it is more than likely that all Americans ultimately were victimized by the Court’s 
unprincipled power grab.  None of this detracts, however, from the plain fact that Thomas’s vote 
victimized black people even as it victimized others. 
  Whether Thomas’s alienation accomplishes some socially useful purpose is doubtful at 
best.  The personal freedom or liberty of one individual—Clarence Thomas—might be socially 
valuable.  See Bryce-Laporte & Thomas, supra note 10, at 384–85.  The question, however, is 
whether we can afford the cost, or bear the negative externalities that might flow from an 
irresponsible exercise of individual freedom.  Exaggerated claims of autonomy ignore the 
complex interconnectedness that constitutes social reality.  See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
 25. Clarence Thomas finds support from individual African-American conservatives, few in 
number though they may be.  See infra note 357 and accompanying text.  On the other hand, 
whites regularly fawn over Clarence Thomas.  See generally, Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism 
of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the 
Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351 (2002) (praising Thomas’s 
“individualism” in the area of property rights); Senator John D. Ashcroft, Justice Clarence 
Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313, 313 (2000) 
(lauding Thomas’s “vital role in advancing the conservative legal tradition of interpreting the law, 
not creating it”); Edwin Meese, III, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 349, 349 (2000) (applauding Thomas’s “fidelity to the Constitution”); David N. Mayer, 
Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 339 (1996) (approving Thomas’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 26. See Michael deHaven Newsom, Independent Counsel?  No.  Ombudsman? Yes: A 
Parable of American Ideology and Myth, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 141, 148–51 (2000) (defining 
ideologies as macro-narratives and myths as micro-narratives). 
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jurist and a fierce and persistent critic of Clarence Thomas, in a law review 
article.27  This macro-narrative celebrates the works of African-Americans and 
their white allies in the struggle to make America’s promise a reality for 
African-Americans and others for whom the dream has been long deferred.  
Justice Thomas gave the second, the “Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative,” a 
clear shape and expression in an important and revealing law review article.28  
Thomas’s macro-narrative celebrates the works of white men of illiberal racial 
views and casts African-Americans in the role of mere spectators.29  Part III 
will return to Judge Higginbotham and study his criticism of Justice Thomas, 
which began in 1992,30 was continued two years later,31 and was reaffirmed yet 
again in 1995 in a speech delivered at New York University.32  The judge’s 
œuvres have led to several responses from African-Americans, three of which 
warrant comment.33  This encounter demonstrates the isolation of Clarence 
Thomas from large numbers of the community of black law professors.  Part 
IV will leave Clarence Thomas and A. Leon Higginbotham, at least for the 
nonce, and turn to an overview of African-American political ideology,34 and 
will demonstrate that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative more nearly reflects the 
political views of African-Americans than does the competing Color-Blindness 
Macro-Narrative.  Part V will return to the words and deeds of Justice Thomas 
and demonstrate that alienation plausibly accounts for them.  Part VI will 
examine Justice Thomas’s place in African-American communities by looking 
at the controversy that continues to swirl around Thomas through the prism of 
the African-American characters in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s sprawling, unruly, 
and racist novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  When all is said and done, Clarence 
Thomas, whose governing macro-narrative and conservative ideology appear 
to differ not at all from that of the most reactionary whites, and most nearly 
 
 27. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal 
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992) [hereinafter Open Letter]. 
 28. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of 
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 691 (1987). 
 29. See id. 
 30. Open Letter, supra note 27. 
 31. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 
1405 (1994) [hereinafter Retrospect]. 
 32. Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Speech at New York University (Nov. 1995) (broadcasted 
nationally on C-SPAN) [hereinafter Speech]. 
 33. See generally, Evelyn Wilson, Comments on “An Open Letter to Justice Clarence 
Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague,” 20 S.U. L. REV. 141 (1993); Randall Kennedy, 
Justice Thomas and Racial Loyalty, 20 AMERICAN LAWYER 91 (1998); Stephen F. Smith, The 
Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for New Black Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 
513 (1999–2000). 
 34. Political ideologies are, perforce, macro-narratives.  See Newsom, supra note 26.  
However, they constitute merely one subset of macro-narratives.  The macro-narratives telling the 
story of the African-American struggle are not necessarily political narratives. 
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resembles Sambo, one of Simon Legree’s black henchmen who helped Legree 
murder Uncle Tom.  Not surprisingly, Sambo was deeply and profoundly 
alienated from other blacks on Legree’s hellish Louisiana plantation.  Part VII 
will briefly discuss the “fit” between Thomas’s victimizing alienation and the 
Supreme Court, given its dedication to white racial hegemony. 
II.  A CLASH OF MACRO-NARRATIVES 
A. The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative 
Judge Higginbotham clearly believed in the moral power and force of the 
macro-narratives that recount the struggles, hopes, dreams, and aspirations of 
African-Americans for equal justice in America, narratives that often centered 
on the continuing work of civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations.35  
Collectively, these macro-narratives comprise the Civil Rights Macro-
Narrative (Narrative), and they powerfully reinforce McGary’s insight that 
black institutions can ameliorate black alienation largely through means of 
community or group identification.36  Higginbotham’s construction of the 
Narrative specifically related to and incorporated the life of Clarence Thomas 
as a life distant and disconnected in important ways from other blacks.  
Higginbotham thereby underscored Thomas’s alienation from large numbers of 
black people, and he used that alienation to punctuate and dramatize the 
Narrative. 
For Judge Higginbotham, the Narrative embodied “the culmination of 
years of heartbreaking work by thousands who preceded” Justice Thomas.37  It 
consisted of “the memory of their sacrifices.”38  The Narrative related “this 
country’s history of civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations; its 
history of voting rights; and its history of housing and privacy rights.”39  The 
history “has affected [Thomas’s] past and present life.”40  The Narrative also 
declared that, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, “for millions of 
Americans, there still remain ‘hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled,’”41 
because this country “continue[s] to struggle for equality.”42  James Baldwin 
had told us that as of 1962, just before the centennial of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, “the country is celebrating one hundred years of freedom one 
 
 35. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1015–18. 
 36. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1007. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1013 (quoting Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United 
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987)). 
 42. See Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1013. 
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hundred years too soon.”43  The core truth of the Narrative lies in the ongoing 
unfinished struggle of African-Americans for true racial equality. 
Higginbotham declared that the struggles that comprise the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative produced substantial gains for Clarence Thomas.44  
Higginbotham constructed the following four-part analysis in order to advance 
his argument: (1) [T]he impact of the work of civil rights lawyers and civil 
rights organizations on [Thomas’s] life; (2) other than having picked a few 
individuals to be their favorite colored person, what it is that the conservatives 
of each generation have done that has been of significant benefit to African-
Americans, women, or other minorities; (3) the impact of the eradication of 
racial barriers in the voting on [Thomas’s] own confirmation, and (4) the 
impact of civil rights victories in the area of housing and privacy on 
[Thomas’s] personal life.45 
On the first point, Judge Higginbotham referred specifically to and 
incorporated into the Narrative, the works of Charles Hamilton Houston, 
William Henry Hastie, Thurgood Marshall, “and that small cadre of other 
lawyers associated with them, who laid the groundwork for success in the 
twentieth-century racial civil rights cases.”46  For Judge Higginbotham, “[t]he 
philosophy of civil rights protest evolved out of the fact that black people were 
forced to confront this country’s racist institutions without the benefit of equal 
access to those institutions.”47  The meaning of such protest, as it manifested 
itself in the Narrative, was well put by Frederick Douglass: 
  The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all 
concessions yet made to her august claims, have been borne of earnest 
struggle . . . .  If there is no struggle there is no progress 
. . . . 
  This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may 
be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle.  Power concedes nothing 
without a demand.  It never did and it never will.48 
Thus, “[t]he struggles of civil rights organizations and civil rights lawyers 
have been both moral and physical, and their victories have been neither easy 
 
 43. Id. at 1014 (quoting James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time: My Dungeon Shook, in THE 
PRICE OF THE TICKET 336 (1985)). 
 44. Id. at 1015. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1016. 
 48. See id. at 1016 (quoting Philip S. Foner, West India Emancipation, Speech delivered by 
Frederick Douglass at Canadaigua, New York (Aug. 4, 1857), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850–1860, at 437 (1950)). 
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nor sudden.”49  But there were victories even if other victories continue to 
elude our grasp.50  Civil rights protests worked.51 
Finally, Judge Higginbotham incorporated a series of micro-narratives 
illustrating the larger theme of the Narrative by way of individual cases and 
circumstances and by way of moral and physical protest, beginning in 1833.52  
Grounding the grand Narrative in a series of micro-narratives demonstrated 
and reinforced its legitimacy, reality, and its moral force and claims. 
On the question of the contribution of conservatives, mainly if not 
exclusively white, to African-Americans and their struggle to get out from 
under racist oppression, Judge Higginbotham declared that “[a]t every turn, the 
conservatives, either by tacit approbation or by active complicity, tried to 
derail the struggle for equal rights in this country.”53  Again, he referred to 
specific cases, using micro-narratives to the same effect as in the first segment 
or element of the Narrative, as he pointed to George Bush (the elder), Ronald 
Reagan, and Strom Thurmond and their opposition to civil rights legislation.54  
Alliance with white conservatives has not advanced the goals and objectives of 
the struggles that inform the Narrative. 
With regard to voting rights, Judge Higginbotham argued that many 
members of the Senate, facing the Thomas nomination, had to “weigh[] the 
potential backlash in their states of the black vote that favored [Thomas] for 
emotional reasons and the conservative white vote that favored [Thomas] for 
ideological reasons.”55  The very success of the work of civil rights lawyers 
and civil rights organizations in overturning barriers to the franchise had 
created a situation in which senators had to take the views of black voters into 
account, something that they did not have to do in the days of Benjamin 
Tillman, a racist senator from South Carolina, in the early years of the last 
century56 when the struggle had borne but little fruit. 
On the final point, Judge Higginbotham showed how the works of civil 
rights lawyers and civil rights institutions had broken down the barriers erected 
by laws designed to segregate blacks and whites by geography or district and 
to criminalize interracial marriages.  Here again, he used micro-narratives to 
shape and explain the larger macro-narrative.57 
The moral power or force of the Narrative certainly speaks to African-
Americans, including Clarence Thomas who has clearly benefited from the 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1016–18. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1017. 
 53. Id. at 1019. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 1020–21. 
 56. Id. at 1021. 
 57. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1022–25. 
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struggles, and imposes affirmative duties on them, the duty to struggle, as 
Frederick Douglass might have put it, to persuade power to concede rights to 
the powerless. 58  The Narrative calls for an African-American community and 
not idiosyncratic individualism.  It, by its terms, however, presents serious 
difficulties for blacks who are alienated from their own people and who cannot 
easily make common cause with other African-Americans, who cannot and do 
not “belong” to African-American structures, institutions, and organizations.  
The duty to struggle, implicit in the Narrative, presupposes a belonging, a 
sense of identification with a larger social reality, as well as a decent respect 
and gratitude for those whose works produced a benefit. 
Whether or not the Narrative similarly speaks to non-African-Americans is 
largely beside the point, the question being whether or not it calls as one of its 
beneficiaries, Clarence Thomas.  The implications of the Narrative as to how 
non-African-Americans should form community and with whom as well as to 
the moral significance of alienation or nonconformity, lie beyond the scope of 
this paper.  However, a belief in the power and force and the concomitant 
duties of African-Americans derived from the Narrative—to join in the moral 
and physical struggle rather than to reject and demean it—lay at the heart of 
Judge Higginbotham’s critique of Justice Thomas.  The thorn in Judge 
Higginbotham’s side was not only that Thomas, a black man, rejected the 
moral claim of the Narrative, notwithstanding the benefits that he had received, 
but that Thomas had the power and authority to act on that rejection in ways 
that were harmful to the struggles, hopes, dreams, and aspirations of African-
Americans.  Judge Higginbotham’s critics, like Justice Thomas, rejected or 
 
 58. Elsewhere this author has addressed the question of the moral power or force of macro-
narrative and micro-narratives.  See Newsom, supra note 26 (arguing that the ideology of the 
Watergate break-in and the myth of Richard Nixon as the bad and Archibald Cox as the good led 
the country into making a disastrous mistake in creating the Independent Counsel); Michael 
deHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 40 WASHBURN 
L.J. 187 (2001) [hereinafter Newsom, Protestant Empire] (arguing that an ideology of Anti-
Roman Catholicism, dedication to the Protestantization of the subject peoples, a commitment to 
pan-Protestantism, a belief in social reform, and a pragmatic commitment to a war of attrition and 
a willingness to exercise restraint, albeit with the threat of force in the background, gave rise to 
the Protestant Empire and a highly problematic Church-state macro-narrative); Michael deHaven 
Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 219 (2002) [hereinafter Newsom, Common School Religion] (arguing that the 
refusal of the Supreme Court to embrace the macro-narrative developed by the minority of state 
courts and state court judges that had struck down or limited—or would have, in the case of 
judges filing dissenting opinions—the reach of common school religion, compromised the ability 
of the Court to fashion a workable set of rules to restrain common school religion in an era of 
increasing religious diversity, thus giving majoritarian religion more sway in the common schools 
that would be the case if the state court macro-narrative (albeit a minority macro-narrative) had 
prevailed). 
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ignored the moral or normative claims of the Narrative, seeking to avoid moral 
obloquy. 
B. The Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative 
Another macro-narrative has emerged to challenge the Civil Rights Macro-
Narrative.  This one, largely fashioned by Justice Thomas, although one his 
acolytes, Stephen F. Smith, a former clerk of Justice Thomas and now a law 
professor, has also helped to shape it, is the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative 
(Counter-Narrative).  The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative embodies a racial 
consciousness—the struggle of largely, if not exclusively, African-American 
civil rights lawyers and civil rights organizations to gain equal justice for 
African-Americans and others oppressed and subordinated by and in this 
country.  The moral claim is that such a consciousness is necessary if one is to 
further the objective of equal justice for all in America.  If race is the defining 
fact of American history, experience, culture, and tradition, then the race-
consciousness of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative has moral and normative 
force.  If race consciousness led to the oppression of racial minorities, African-
Americans in particular, then race consciousness can lead to their liberation.59  
It is this proposition that the Counter-Narrative challenges. 
The Counter-Narrative confronts the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative 
directly.  The latter focuses primarily on the works of African-Americans 
engaged in the struggle for civil rights.  Judge Higginbotham called out 
“Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Charles Hamilton 
Houston, A. Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, W.E.B. Dubois, Roy 
Wilkins, Whitney Young, Martin Luther King, Judge William Henry Hastie, 
[and] Justice[] Thurgood Marshall. . . .”60  For good measure, he also called out 
Earl Warren and William Brennan, white Americans who sought to further at 
least some of the goals and objectives of the moral and physical protest that 
constitutes the heart and the soul of the struggle for equal rights in America.61  
By contrast, Justice Thomas’s pantheon of African-American heroes consisted 
of Frederick Douglass.62  The true heroes of his macro-narrative, however, 
 
 59. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (declaring that “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race”). 
 60. Open Letter, supra note 27, at 1026. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Thomas, supra note 28, at 691.  Thomas sought to appropriate “the original Civil Rights 
movement” and John Hope Franklin to his cause.  Id. at 694.  However, Thomas never defined 
the “original” Civil Rights Movement, and he quoted Franklin out of context, revealing a certain 
intellectual dishonesty.  Franklin did indeed refer to slavery as “the most remarkable anomaly in 
the history of the country” just as Thomas insisted.  John Hope Franklin, Slavery and the 
Constitution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1688, 1695 (Leonard W. 
Levy et al. eds., 1986).  Franklin, however, was not referring to any supposed lofty ideal 
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were white men: the Founders, Abraham Lincoln, and the first Justice 
Harlan.63  In a profoundly ironic way, given Thomas’s disdain for playing the 
“victim card,”64 Thomas’s pantheon turns African-Americans into passive 
observers, the beneficiaries of grandiloquent ideas and principles allegedly 
advanced by various and sundry white Americans, most of whom harbored 
distinctly racist attitudes when it came to African-Americans.65  Black people 
are the victims, given Thomas’s hagiography, of white racists who rejected the 
lofty ideals and principals of other white racists.  Freedom and liberty arise not 
from the moral and physical protest and struggle of African-Americans but, 
somehow, from white racists deciding to honor principles that they had 
observed in the breach for the entirety of our colonial and national history.  
Black people’s struggles come to naught in a nomos in which the heroes are 
largely white racists who bore false witness to their exalted ideals.  In such a 
moral universe, the alienation of an African-American from other blacks poses 
no great problems, for such a moral universe provides a haven and a safe 
harbor for alienated black people. 
Thomas’s Counter-Narrative rested on the fundamental abstract 
proposition that the ideals of the Declaration of Independence constitute “the 
founding principles of equality and liberty.”66  Referring to Abraham Lincoln, 
Thomas made the political ideological claim that those principles “led to the 
principle of government by consent, limited government, majority rule, and 
separation of powers.”67  Moving beyond this self-interested excursus, Thomas 
maintained that “Lincoln’s case against slavery insisted on the principle of 
equality as fundamental for America.”68  Given Lincoln’s well-known belief in 
the social inferiority of African-Americans as against white Americans,69 
 
contained in the Declaration of Independence, or any words or writings of Abraham Lincoln.  
With regard to the Declaration of Independence, Franklin correctly noted that the signers rejected 
draft language that would have indicted the King of England for his assent to the slave trade.  Id. 
at 1688.  Franklin made no high-flown claims about the Declaration of Independence.  Similarly, 
with respect to Abraham Lincoln, Franklin was decidedly cool.  Id. at 1694–95. 
 63. See Thomas, supra note 28, at 693. 
 64. See id. at 698. 
 65. Abraham Lincoln rejected white-black racial equality.  See Raoul Berger, Constitutional 
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1, 20 (1993–1994) (stating that Abraham 
Lincoln “opposed slavery and racial equality with equal intensity”); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE 
BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 81 (1960) (quoting a speech of President Lincoln rejecting 
racial equality).  Thomas Jefferson was even more vicious in his racist views.  See THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (William Peden ed., 1954).  With respect to the 
first Justice Harlan, Thomas is reduced to trying to explain away his racist remarks in his dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  See Thomas, supra note 28, at 701. 
 66. Thomas, supra note 28, at 692. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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Thomas’s “principle of equality” verges on incoherence.  Nonetheless, Thomas 
took the view that the Declaration of Independence had a “universal meaning” 
that rejected slavery.70  Thomas went so far as to argue that the “three-fifths” 
clause somehow was an anti-slavery text because it reduced “who could be 
counted among these being represented” in the House of Representatives from 
the slave states.71  Thomas’s argument makes no sense because African-
Americans could not vote and would never, as slaves, be able to vote.  Slave 
owners, therefore, had greater rather than less political power, because, in a 
functionalist real world sense, they could cast votes for their “three-fifths” 
slaves no matter what their slaves thought of the political choices of their 
masters.  In the non-slave states, those whites who were counted—at least 
males—could vote.  Whites of low social and economic standing could, 
depending on the voting eligibility rules, trump the votes of rich and powerful 
whites, should they deem it in their interest to do so.72  Such a political 
dynamic could never play itself out, even in theory, in the slave states.  Instead, 
Thomas again reinforced his reduction of African-Americans to mere observer 
status, shut out from participation in the political economy, and yet Thomas 
found something to praise in the constitutional treatment of this depraved and 
degenerate Eighteenth Century society.73 
Thomas turned next to Brown v. Board of Education.74  He criticized the 
Court’s opinion because it “made sensitivity the paramount issue.”75  Thomas 
referred to the infamous remark in Plessy v. Ferguson to the effect that “we 
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored 
race with a badge of inferiority.”76  He argued that “[t]he Plessy  psychology 
would have it that laws and social practices have no influence at all over how 
people, especially those recently released from slavery, view themselves.”77  In 
contrast, “[t]he Brown psychology makes the legal and social environment all-
controlling.”78  In lieu of “sensitivity,” Thomas offered up the human capacity 
to reason and choose objectively.79  Thus, for Thomas, “the Brown focus on 
 
 70. Thomas, supra note 28, at 695. 
 71. Id. at 696. 
 72. Indeed, it was precisely the fear that naturalized Catholic immigrants, largely a group of 
low economic standing, could control the outcome of American elections that lay at the heart of 
one of the great works in defense of a white, Protestant America.  See LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA 
FOR THE WEST 49–50 (1835) (arguing, inter alia, that steps be taken to curb immigration).  
Lyman Beecher, of course, was the father of Harriet Beecher Stowe.  See infra Part VI. 
 73. Thomas, supra note 28. 
 74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 75. Thomas, supra note 28, at 698. 
 76. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 77. Thomas, supra note 28, at 699. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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environment overlooks the real problem with segregation, its origin in slavery, 
which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles.  Had Brown done 
so, it would have been forced to talk about slavery, which it never mentions.”80  
Thomas is, perhaps unwittingly, also making the argument that in a world of 
“reason” rather than “sensibility” the alienated African-American can find that 
safe harbor because it might be “reasonable” to be alienated. 
All of this led, for Thomas, to the “color-blind Constitution,”81 the core of 
his argument, and the heart of the Counter-Narrative.  Thomas conceded that 
the idea failed to attract much support, criticizing both conservatives 
uninterested in equality and liberals like Justice Brennan.82  Thomas’s 
argument turned largely on his reading of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.  
He insisted that “Justice Harlan understood, as did Lincoln, that his task was to 
bring out the best of the Founders’ arguments regarding the universal 
principles of equality and liberty.”83  Thomas argued that those principles give 
meaning to the idea of a “color-blind Constitution.”84  Thomas excused 
Harlan’s racism, on open display in his Plessy dissent, by arguing that Harlan 
was in fact calling the white race to adhere to the “ultimate American 
principle . . . that all men are created equal.”85  Thus, given Thomas’s rewriting 
of Harlan’s opinion, “[t]he ‘superiority’ of the white race would appear to 
depend on its acknowledgement that it is not superior but equal and a ‘color-
blind Constitution’ would insure that this revolutionary principle would be 
always kept in mind.”86  Thomas totally missed the irony of his suggestion that 
white superiority was non-superiority, or at least the idea thereof.  As noted 
above, Thomas has reduced African-Americans to mere spectators of a white 
drama.87  Everything depends on what white people do.  African-Americans 
are powerless to affect the plot line of the drama.  Moral and physical protest, 
which Frederick Douglass favored, no matter what Thomas believed was 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 700. 
 82. Thomas, supra note 28, at 700. 
 83. Id. at 701. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Such reductionism also produces bad political science.  See Hanes Walton, Jr., Black 
Southern Politics: The Influences of Bunche, Martin and Key, in BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A LINKAGE ANALYSIS 32–38 (Hanes Walton, Jr. ed., 1994).  Reducing 
African-Americans to mere observers overlooks “the purposeful activity of black people to 
acquire, use, and maintain [political] power.”  Rickey Hill, The Study of Black Politics: Notes on 
Rethinking the Paradigm, in BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A LINKAGE 
ANALYSIS, supra, at 11.  Hill, of course, merely restates the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative as a 
political narrative.  See id. 
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Douglass’s constitutional jurisprudence,88 has been reduced to appealing to 
some notion of reason and objectivity and hoping that white people would 
figure out that they should pay attention to what Thomas Jefferson wrote, not 
what he and countless other white slave masters, including a fair number of 
Thomas’s revered Founders, did.  It should not matter, therefore, that some 
blacks are alienated from their own race because racial solidarity has nothing 
to do with white people coming to their senses. 
The foregoing summary of Thomas’s views reveals one other fascinating 
aspect.  Not only did he celebrate white racists like Jefferson, Lincoln, and the 
first Justice Harlan, not only did he invent an “original” Civil Rights 
Movement and misread John Hope Franklin, but, with regard to the 
fundamental craft of the construction of narratives, Thomas utterly failed to 
use micro-narratives.  In the construction of his Counter-Narrative, Thomas 
never bothered to explore the complex and intricate relation between the two 
major forms of narrative.  Perhaps this is so because it turns out that Thomas 
cares only about one micro-narrative—his own89—surely a hallmark of 
alienation of the narcissistic sort.  Thus Thomas would have no interest or 
desire to contest the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative at the level of micro-
narratives as constituent elements of macro-narratives, except with his own 
personal micro-narrative.90  For the rest of us, however, Thomas’s blindness 
with respect to micro-narratives, a blindness that has nothing to do with color, 
calls into question the legitimacy of his Counter-Narrative. 
Thomas’s disciple, Stephen F. Smith, elaborated on the Justice’s efforts in 
1987 to construct a macro-narrative that could compete with the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative.91  Smith must have recognized that Thomas’s sterile 
formalism and reliance on abstractions, not to mention his pantheon of white 
heroes, leaving African-Americans largely on the sidelines, presented serious 
problems.  He attempted, therefore, to restate the Color-Blindness Macro-
Narrative as if it were not the narrative of the isolated, alienated African-
American.  Smith began by arguing that there has been a diversity of views in 
 
 88. Thomas argued that Frederick Douglass agreed with him that the Constitution embodied 
the color-blind principle found in the Declaration of Independence.  Thomas, supra note 28, at 
703.  It suffices to note that Douglass might have believed that the Declaration sits “in the center 
of the frame formed by the Constitution.”  Id.  However, Douglass, unlike Thomas, was smart 
enough to know that the civil rights struggle called for more than Thomas has been willing to 
grant or concede.  One might have more respect for Thomas’s views if he were willing to accept 
the simple proposition that the struggle for civil rights requires the use of all of the weapons and 
strategies available to African-Americans at any particular time.  Thomas is utterly incapable of 
adopting this new. 
 89. See Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas at 
the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. 429, 489–90 (1998) (arguing that Thomas will engage his own 
personal story but ignore the narratives of “faceless, impersonal others”). 
 90. See Part V, infra. 
 91. See Smith, supra note 33. 
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the black community even on civil rights issues.92  Smith characterized W.E.B. 
Dubois as a dissenter, “rejecting the orthodox approach of Booker T. 
Washington.”93  He continued: “This long tradition of dissent within the black 
community on civil rights issues continued well after the turn of the century,”94 
referring to Marcus Garvey’s stand against integration and for repatriation to 
Africa, as against others like Thurgood Marshall, to Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party, and to Justice Thomas and 
Shelby Steele in opposition to “many in the black community [who] agitate for 
race-conscious remedies such as affirmative action in the belief that racism 
constitutes an insuperable barrier to black progress.”95  Alienation is now 
merely a matter of dissent. 
The difficulty with Smith’s argument is that it supposes that dissent is 
somehow fungible.  He failed to confront the claim made by the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative that the moral and physical protest, the struggle for equal 
justice in America, binds us into a community, a complex web of not only 
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, but also “no rights,” duties, 
disabilities, and liabilities.96  While “rights talk” has dominated the rhetoric of 
the struggle, 97 perhaps sometimes to its detriment,98 the truth has always 
 
 92. Id. at 530. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 530–31. 
 96. This terminology first appeared in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 97. See William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and 
Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 698–702 
(2000) (tracing rights talk back at least as far as the New Deal). 
 98. See Melissa Cole, The Color-Blind Constitution, Civil Rights-Talk, and a Multicultural 
Discourse for a Post-Reparations World, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 128 (1999) 
(arguing that “[t]he failure of affirmative action . . . results from its roots in ‘civil rights-talk’”); 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, 
and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1477 (2002) (noting that Critical Race Theorists both 
“acknowledge the limitations of rights talk” but “also believe that rights play a vital role in 
antiracism”).  But see Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: 
Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 367 (2000) (arguing that 
rights talk was essential to political organizing); Daria Roithmayr, Left Over Rights, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2001) (noting that “[w]hile rights talk in a particular moment may well serve 
to drain political energy through a focus on litigation, in other historical moments rights talk 
might help inspire political and social movements for change” and “[r]ights talk is not always and 
inevitably depoliticizing (take, for example, the civil rights movement)”). 
  For a more general criticism of rights talk, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: 
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14 (1991) (referring to a rhetoric that “in its 
absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue 
that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground” 
because “[i]n its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the 
benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding 
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remained that rights are not mere abstractions, but that they take their meaning 
in relations, not only relations between blacks and whites but also between 
African-Americans.  The moral claim of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is 
rooted in the norms of community and reciprocal responsibilities,99 not in 
abstract “rights,” notwithstanding the rhetoric of the struggle for racial justice 
in America.  Thus, some dissent falls within the contours and ambit of the 
African-American communitarian norm, and some dissent does not.  Even 
Booker T. Washington’s wretched accommodationism fell within it.  He 
constantly pandered to reactionary whites, but Washington secretly financed 
civil rights litigation.100  Perhaps one might say that Washington’s 
conservatism derived not from some silly notions about the Declaration of 
Independence, or, more to the point, the supposed lofty ideals of white men 
whose actions betrayed a different set of beliefs and priorities, but from an 
appreciation of the practical inability of African-Americans to engage in a 
moral and physical protest, given the deeply entrenched racism of the vast 
majority of American whites of Washington’s time.101  The problem, of course, 
is that during the years of his hegemony, from 1895, the year of his infamous 
Atlanta Compromise speech,102 to 1915, the year of his death, whites took 
 
personal and civic obligations”).  As far as she goes, Professor Glendon is probably correct.  
However, she utterly fails to recognize that African-American communitarianism has so far 
blocked the degeneration of rights talk by and between African-Americans into the kind of selfish 
individualism that she decries.  Although, it would seem that Clarence Thomas is the exception 
that proves the rule.  The collapse of white American political discourse and the concomitant 
devaluation of social duty and responsibility results from an extreme individualism foreign to the 
large majority of African-Americans, not from the struggles and the related rhetoric that lie at the 
core of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.  The normative meaning of rights talk is entirely 
contextual. 
  However, Professor Glendon’s critique of rights talk might have meaning for African-
Americans to which we need to pay heed.  The problematic feature of rights talk for any racial or 
ethnic group stems from the failure of such rhetoric explicitly to yoke individual rights and 
communitarian duties.  Professor Glendon has described a present reality for white American 
political discourse that might become a future reality for African-American discourse should 
black people lose the communitarianism that lies at the heart of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative 
and the broader black experience in America.  See MICHAEL DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE 
ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERCIAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 11 (2001).  The deep 
and profound social, cultural and theological implications of this African-American 
communitarianism will be the subject of a future essay. 
 99. And so it is that African-American political ideologies, again a subset of macro-
narratives, with the exception of black conservatism, reflect a communitarian perspective.  See 
Newsom, supra note 26 and accompanying text; DAWSON, supra note 98, at 31. 
 100. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–
1944, at 15–16 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 304–05 (2000). 
 101. See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 283. 
 102. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 101–02 (William L. Andrews ed., 1996). 
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Washington’s accommodationism as “a signal to squeeze blacks harder.”103  
Perhaps one might better say that Washington badly misjudged the situation.  
However, Washington remained a part of the family, even if not a terribly 
helpful one. 
There is also no doubt but that W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Thurgood 
Marshall, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, and the Black Panthers 
remained members of the family, whatever assessment one might make of their 
respective contributions to its welfare.  The question remains whether Justice 
Thomas has engaged in radical alienation by simply abandoning us and leaving 
the family.  Smith, in his appeal to black dissent, has not shown that Thomas is 
still with us. Instead, there is good reason to believe that most of the dissenters 
to whom he referred, Booker T. Washington in particular, accepted, in 
substantial degree, the communitarian norm.  Certainly Smith has not 
demonstrated, and neither has Thomas, that there is any institutional embrace 
or support of the Counter-Narrative among African-Americans.  Given 
McGary’s careful analysis,104 one might conclude that Thomas and Smith have 
conceded the point and accepted the moral judgment that they are alienated 
African-Americans. 
Nonetheless, Smith continued his effort to integrate the Counter-Narrative 
into the fabric of African-American history and experience, trumping the 
significance or importance of community, by stating that “[b]lack people have 
struggled too hard and too long in this country to surrender the precious right 
to read and think for themselves—rights that were denied them in slavery—to 
any orthodoxy, whether black or white.”105  After arguing that if African-
Americans insisted that all blacks should think alike, he concluded that we 
would have to accept the possibility that all whites should think alike and, as a 
minority group, accept that we would not be able “to win any gains in a 
democracy based on the principle of majority-rule” and “[t]he most blacks can 
expect . . . is handouts from kind-hearted whites, who are moved either by a 
sense of compassion or noblesse obligee [sic] to put aside their ‘white’ way of 
thinking.”106 
Smith fared no better on this point.  He never adequately debated the 
central assertion of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative that the African-
American community has a moral claim on each one of us.  Smith created a 
false dichotomy between that claim and the “precious right to read and think 
for [oneself]. . . .”107  Leaving aside the question of the proper relation between 
 
 103. Peter Eisenstadt, Introduction to BLACK CONSERVATISM: ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL 
AND POLITICAL HISTORY, at ix, xix (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999) [hereinafter BLACK 
CONSERVATISM]. 
 104. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
 105. Smith, supra note 33, at 531 (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. at 531–32. 
 107. Id. at 531. 
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the individual and the nestled communities to which he belongs, the practical 
issue, of course, concerns not at all how Thomas thinks, but rather how he 
votes on the Court.  Thus Smith had to make a larger claim of autonomous 
individual right—to read and think for oneself and to act thereon.  Smith, the 
acolyte, could, it appears, never quite bring himself to say such a thing.  The 
great insight of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is that it treasures creative 
thought and imagination, but insists that before acting upon those ideas, the 
thinker sit down and talk things over within the family.  Moral and physical 
protest requires nothing less, if it is to succeed.  It calls for organization, 
consensus, and a willingness to think the problem through from the point of 
view of the larger African-American community, the community that sanctions 
and gives form to the protest itself.  Put somewhat differently, the struggle that 
informs the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative does not denigrate the right to think 
for one’s self.  What is does do, however, is pass judgment on how one acts on 
those thoughts, with whom one acts, and against whom one acts.  In short, 
Smith misrepresented the question.  He merely seeks to gain acceptance for 
those alienated from the African-American community and its institutions and 
structures as “free thinkers,” ignoring the inescapable fact that thoughts might 
or might not do much harm, but actions certainly can.  Smith sought to avoid 
the hard question posed by Geyer and Heinz that sometimes those who are 
alienated perpetrate and give effect to alienating conditions that harm victims 
of alienation.108  Ultimately, those who fashion the Counter-Narrative cannot 
avoid the conclusion that they stand, to one degree or another, apart from the 
moral and physical protest that forms the heart of the Narrative, just as they 
must grant that they stand apart from the community of struggle and protest, 
and, as far as African-Americans are concerned, that they stand apart from the 
community and institutions of African-Americans. 
Undaunted, Smith reprised Justice Thomas’s vision of the color-blind 
Constitution.  Smith wrote: 
Justice Thomas is being true to the principles of the civil rights movement in 
calling for colorblindness.  It was this country’s unfortunate willingness to 
tolerate convenient exceptions from the colorblindness principle embodied in 
the Declaration of Independence (and, later, in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution) that led to slavery in the first place.  
That is how millions and millions of blacks came to be enslaved and treated as 
chattel in a Nation whose charter expressly committed it to the “self-evident” 
principle that “all men are created equal” and “are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights.”109 
Smith has necessarily accused Thurgood Marshall and other civil rights 
leaders of abandoning the principles that inform the struggle at the heart of the 
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Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.  Indeed, Smith went out of his way to argue that 
Marshall’s appeal to colorblindness as an advocate in Brown v. Board of 
Education110 reflected the commitment to colorblindness as a legal and moral 
principle.111  Smith overlooked the fact that the Narrative has always had a 
racial consciousness.  Colorblindness, therefore, could never guide or shape the 
struggle as a first principle.  Rather, colorblindness has always served as 
merely an argument employed when civil rights lawyers and civil rights 
organizations believed that it might advance the struggle, and they left it to one 
side when it did not advance the struggle.  The objective of the Civil Rights 
struggle has never been colorblindness.  Rather, it has been the elimination of 
racial oppression.  Therefore, when Smith argued that the principle of 
colorblindness “freed blacks from the shackles of slavery and lifted the dark 
veil of segregation,”112 he had confused means and ends, a serious blunder. 
But more serious than even the insult to the integrity of the Civil Rights 
Movement and to the African-American institutions that nurtured and 
supported that movement, the failure to recognize candidly the reality of 
battling macro-narratives, yet further evidence of alienation, is Smith’s fatuous 
assertion that slavery resulted from the country’s willingness to abandon the 
colorblindness principle.  The British North American colonists established 
slavery long before 1776.  They established an elaborate system of slavery that 
ultimately came to rest on a deeply felt belief in the inferiority of Africans (and 
later African-Americans, as African slaves endured the process over time, of 
acculturation to a new status and a new country), a bitter and unyielding 
racism.113  Slavery “became firmly established in . . . most of the mainland 
[British North American colonies] . . . by the end of the seventeenth 
century.”114  Thus, the reality, the context in which the events of 1776 take 
meaning includes: 
The linkage of . . . [slavery and race] in whites’ minds [that] produced a 
derivative fusion of the two objectives of enslavement: labor coercion and race 
control.  When slavery as a system of labor coercion was abolished by 1865, 
the race-control element of slavery lingered on, more powerful than before.  
The fusion is with us even today, as we still debate whether the constitutional 
and statutory structure that abolished slavery-as-labor-coercion can be used to 
eradicate the vestiges of slavery-as-race-control.115 
One must ask in what way did the colorblindness principle inhabit the 
heart and soul of the British North American colonists in the years leading up 
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 111. Smith, supra note 33, at 534. 
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to 1776.  A fair reading of history suggests that the search will yield no fruit.  
The principle simply does not exist.  To suppose that the Declaration of 
Independence overthrows the intense and concentrated history of slavery and 
racism,116 yoked together in the minds of most Eighteenth Century whites, 
including the likes of Thomas Jefferson, not to mention their Seventeenth 
Century forebears, is to suppose that pigs can fly.  Thus Smith’s casual 
reference to slavery as a “convenient exception” cannot bear its own weight. 
Smith made one more attempt to downplay the problem of alienation.117  
Recasting the claim of “dissent,” he argued that Thomas’s conservatism fits in 
the mainstream of African-American thought, given certain polling data that 
tends to suggest “that an incredible 70% of blacks nationwide flatly reject 
liberalism as an overarching political philosophy.”118  Smith then reported on 
polls that showed blacks favoring the death penalty, supporting the “[denial of] 
increased welfare payments to welfare recipients who have more children . . . 
back[ing] mandatory sentences for drug dealers, and . . . feel[ing] black leaders 
are too quick to cite racism as an excuse for black crime.”119  Still other polling 
data revealed that varying majorities of blacks favor school choice, 
“disapprove of mandatory [school] busing,” “feel that minorities should not 
receive preferential treatment to make up for past discrimination (affirmative 
action),” believe in God, and are pro-life, “flatly opposing abortion under any 
circumstances.”120  Smith hoped for a political realignment on the horizon, but, 
even granting that such realignment might not take place, he concluded that 
“on a whole host of issues, including civil rights, the black community is more 
instinctively conservative than liberal.”121 
As far as it goes, Smith is correct.  Other polling data, suggests, however, 
that whether or not African-Americans reject or support liberalism, they 
emphatically reject the political conservatism of Clarence Thomas.122  The 
structure and logic of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative explain the apparent 
discrepancy in the data.  If the normative moral predicate of the vast majority 
of African-Americans is communitarian,123 then the labels “liberal” and 
“conservative” may obscure, not illuminate, the reality and meaning of 
African-American political and social thought. 
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The 2000 presidential election makes the point.  A supposedly 
conservative subset of the American electorate, black folk, if one believes 
Smith, voted overwhelmingly for Al Gore, the liberal candidate, rejecting 
George Bush, the “compassionate” conservative.  The African-American vote 
for Gore exceeded ninety percent.124  An appreciation of the race-conscious 
and communitarian premise or predicate of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative 
would suggest that the reasons African-Americans support certain arguably 
“conservative” positions differ markedly from the reasons advanced by whites 
in support of those positions. 
Take welfare payments, for instance.  Black people have their own 
perfectly good reasons for opposing a system that appears to pay unwed 
mothers for having more children, reasons having nothing to do with white 
fears of an African-American population explosion.  African-American 
concern rests on the well-founded belief that the black community cannot 
easily accommodate large, poor single-parent families because the resources 
available to African Americans—as a community—to raise and care for those 
children are in perilously short supply.  As another example, take belief in 
God.  While expressing that belief in and through the forms of evangelical 
Protestantism might be problematic for African-Americans,125 God is a source 
of strength, courage, comfort, and repose in the ongoing moral and physical 
protest.  The Black Church—whatever the theological problems of the Black 
Church might be—is one of the few places where African-Americans have 
been able to express many important aspects of their very humanity in an 
institutional and communitarian setting.  Belief in God inexorably follows. 
Of course, from the other side, African-Americans simply do not trust 
white conservatives because alliances with them have not furthered black 
interests, a point that Judge Higginbotham placed in the center of the 
Narrative.126  African-American understandings of various political, social, and 
cultural questions turn on how those issues impact the struggle for equal justice 
and on the health and welfare of the community, whereas white conservatives, 
if history is any guide, stand opposed to that struggle and wish that community 
ill.127  We might agree with white conservatives on many issues, as abstract 
propositions, but we are not inclined to make alliances with them in order to 
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further these issues.128  Again, Smith has blurred the critical distinction at the 
heart of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative between belief and action; black 
people may believe in certain “conservative” ideas, but they are not prepared to 
act upon them in alliance with conservative whites.  There is no room in the 
struggle for such an alliance.  Those who make such an alliance, given our 
experience with white conservatives, are surely alienated from the majority of 
African-Americans. 
The final major element of the Colorblindness Macro-Narrative is the 
claim that life is so much better for so many African-Americans these days that 
we just need to pull up our socks and soldier on.129  Smith acknowledged that 
we have far too many poor people in our midst and that “black leadership must 
turn its focus to creating economic opportunity for the poor.”130  But Smith 
concluded that the problem of black poverty was not a problem of white racism 
but instead, one of black leadership.131  Smith pressed on, insisting that there 
only “have been isolated instances of racially polarized voting in recent 
years.”132  Black leadership has much to account for, but to lay the entire 
problem of black poverty at its feet evidences an isolation from and a rejection 
of that leadership, and therefore, alienation from black people. 
C. The Narrative and the Counter-Narrative Compared 
The Narrative is the story of the black struggle.  The Counter-Narrative is 
the story of a white struggle.133  If either narrative generates heroes, a related 
or cognate set of micro-narratives bearing witness to heroism, the Narrative 
constructs heroes who are largely, but not exclusively, African-American.  The 
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Counter-Narrative constructs heroes who are, with minor exceptions, white.  It 
is difficult to see how the Counter-Narrative can be anything other than the 
voice of alienation. 
However, several important questions remain.  Perhaps the Narrative 
stands for a pessimistic, defeatist view of the condition of African-Americans, 
a view that might conveniently preserve a set of ideological beliefs and 
maintain a set of institutional arrangements, leadership, and leaders—the so-
called civil rights community.  But perhaps it reflects a cold, harsh, realistic 
assessment of the situation in which African-Americans find themselves.  On 
the other hand, perhaps the Counter-Narrative captures an optimistic view of 
that state.  But perhaps it makes an opportunistic understatement of the true 
condition of African-Americans in order to curry favor with reactionary racist 
whites in an attempt to gain individual advantage and trump the civil rights 
community. 
As in many things, there is some truth in all of these propositions.  What 
matters, however, is how much truth they contain.  There are many reasons for 
black people to be wary of the civil rights community.  It has not delivered for 
poor African-Americans.  But, white conservatives have not delivered anything 
for the black poor, and many of us believe that white conservatives wish to 
retard if not reverse whatever gains the black middle class has made.  
Disappointment with the civil rights community, however, does not, by its own 
force, lead to making common cause with white reactionaries.  The civil rights 
community may indeed have to change.  But it does not follow that African 
Americans have to overthrow it.  The Counter-Narrative, however, insists that 
African-Americans should and, furthermore, embrace white reaction.  It is the 
radical, formalist, starkness of the Counter-Narrative that causes it ultimately 
to fail African-Americans and to mark its adherents as alienated African-
Americans. 
III.  JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM AND HIS CRITICS 
This part will analyze the encounter between Judge Higginbotham and his 
critics by focusing primarily on how they use—or do not use—the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative and the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.  It will also 
examine how they view the structure and logic of macro-narratives by 
exploring how they see the relation, if any, between macro-narratives and 
micro-narratives.  This part will also shed some light on the position held by 
African-American law professors134 on Clarence Thomas. 
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Ticket: John Frank, Leon Higginbotham, and One Afternoon at the Supreme Court—Not a 
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A. The Letter from the Judge 
Shortly after Clarence Thomas became a member of the Court, Judge 
Higginbotham wrote his now famous letter to Clarence Thomas.135  The letter 
takes the form of a lecture and a scolding, as if Judge Higginbotham were 
trying both to teach and to reprimand a callow and indifferent student.  Indeed, 
at one point Judge Higginbotham flatly declared that he did “not believe 
that . . . [Clarence Thomas was] indeed the most competent person to be on the 
Supreme Court.”136  And at another point Judge Higginbotham stated 
“[c]andidly, I and many other thoughtful Americans are very concerned about 
your appointment to the Supreme Court.”137  At first blush, such a tone and 
approach seem presumptuous at best and would seem destined to give offense 
because they reek of a certain paternalism and arrogance, if not green-eyed 
envy.  But the tone was defensible, given the logic and structure of the Civil 
Rights Macro-Narrative, even if misguided.138  Thomas is not merely a pupil, 
and Judge Higginbotham is not merely a teacher.  The relation between black 
people, as far as the Narrative is concerned, rests in a complex understanding 
of community.  Any community has both teachers and students, to be sure, but 
one does not think of judges—even African-American judges—merely 
“teaching” other African-American judges.  This suggests that Judge 
Higginbotham, to some degree or another, views Thomas as outside the 
relevant community, as a person who has repudiated that community and its 
governing macro-narrative.  Thus Judge Higginbotham wrote not as if he and 
Thomas were members of the same community, but rather as one within it and 
the other without.  Judge Higginbotham meant either to recall Thomas to the 
community (hence to teach), to rebuke him for leaving it (hence to reprimand), 
or both.  Judge Higginbotham, therefore, undertook his reprimand on the basis 
that Clarence Thomas stood alienated from the African-American community. 
Judge Higginbotham began with a declaration of purpose: to “write this 
letter as a public record so that this generation can understand the challenges 
you face as an Associate Justice to the Supreme Court, and the next can 
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evaluate the choices you have made or will make.”139  He declared that 
Thomas had “the option to preserve or dilute the gains this country has made in 
the struggle for equality.”140  Declaring this to be a “grave responsibility 
indeed,” Judge Higginbotham insisted that Thomas will need to recognize the 
“force of history” within him and that he will need “to remember how you 
arrived where you are now, because you did not get there by yourself.”141  
Judge Higginbotham argued that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative applied to 
Thomas, be he member or renegade.142  In so doing, he was acknowledging the 
race consciousness that forms the heart and center of the Narrative. 
Judge Higginbotham took Thomas to task for failing to demonstrate “an 
insightful understanding on your part on how the evolutionary movement of 
the Constitution143 and the work of civil rights organizations have benefited 
you.”144  He continued: 
Like Sharon McPhail, the President of the National Bar Association, I kept 
asking myself: Will the Real Clarence Thomas Stand Up?  Like her, I 
wondered: “Is Clarence Thomas a ‘conservative with a common touch’ as 
Ruth Marcus refers to him . . . or the ‘counterfeit hero’ he is accused of being 
by Haywood Burns . . . ?”145 
He accused Justice Thomas of making unwarranted attacks on civil rights 
organizations, the Warren Court, and even Justice Thurgood Marshall.146  Put 
differently, Judge Higginbotham was accusing Thomas of disrespecting the 
Narrative and the African-American institutions that supported it.  Perhaps 
Thomas’s attacks were designed to discharge political obligations to Reagan 
and Bush the elder, Judge Higginbotham noted, but he indicated that he hoped 
that Thomas would now “take time out to carefully evaluate some of these 
unjustified attacks.”147  He pressed the point, declaring that Thomas’s attacks 
troubled him “because they convey a stunted knowledge of history and an 
unformed judicial philosophy.”148  As a member of the Court, Judge 
Higginbotham lectured Thomas that he had an obligation to “reflect more 
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deeply on legal history than you ever have before.”149  He graciously did 
admit, however, that he believed that Thomas had “the intellectual depth to 
reflect upon and rethink the great issues the Court has confronted in the past 
and to become truly your own man.”150 
The Judge then laid out the substance of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.  
The first part of the letter, as noted previously,151 lies at the core and consists 
largely of macro-narratives.  The remaining three parts, however, by the very 
way that Judge Higginbotham framed them, sought to relate the works of the 
civil rights community to Thomas’s personal life, his micro-narrative.  
However, even as to the first part, he understood the complex relation between 
the two forms of narrative.  Judge Higginbotham said: 
As you now start to adjudicate cases involving civil rights, I hope you will 
have more judicial integrity than to demean those advocates of the 
disadvantaged who appear before you.  If you and I had not gotten many of the 
positive reinforcements that these [civil rights] organizations fought for and 
that the post-Brown era made possible, probably neither you nor I would be 
federal judges today.152 
Civil rights advocates made it possible for Higginbotham and Thomas to 
become federal judges.  Thus the macro-narratives and the micro-narratives 
reinforce each other. 
The letter concluded with an admonishment: 
You, however, must try to remember that the fundamental problems of the 
disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the powerless have not all been solved 
simply because you have “moved on up” from Pin Point, Georgia, to the 
Supreme Court . . . .  I have written to tell you that your life today, however, 
should be not far removed from the visions and struggles of Frederick 
Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Charles Hamilton Houston, A. 
Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, W.E.B. Dubois, Roy Wilkins, 
Whitney Young, Martin Luther King, Judge William Henry Hastie, Justices 
Thurgood Marshall, Earl Warren, and William Brennan, as well as the 
thousands of others who dedicated much of their lives to create the America 
that made your opportunities possible.  I hope you have the strength of 
character to exemplify those values so that the sacrifices of all these men and 
women will not have been in vain.153 
Judge Higginbotham, rightly concerned that the Court would continue “to 
retreat from protecting the rights of the poor, women, the disadvantaged, 
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minorities, and the powerless,”154 ended “with hope to balance my 
apprehension, I wish you well as a thoughtful and worthy successor to Justice 
Marshall in the ever ongoing struggle to assure equal justice under law for all 
persons.”155 
Judge Higginbotham had called on Justice Thomas to recognize and accept 
the moral force and power of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative and to rejoin 
the community from which he came. 
B. The Comment from the First Law Professor 
Professor Evelyn Wilson responded to Judge Higginbotham’s letter.156  
She reacted to its tone: 
I read Judge Higginbotham’s letter quickly the first time and felt embarrassed 
for Justice Thomas.  He had just assumed a lifetime position at the top of his 
career ladder, one of only nine in the nation, a position from which his 
thoughts, values, perceptions, and priorities will impact not only this country, 
but all humanity.  Before Justice Thomas rendered a single judgment, Judge 
Higginbotham seemed to suggest that Judge Thomas is immature and not 
especially bright.  My head said: Give the boy a chance.  Let him decide what 
to do with his newly gained power.  My heart said: Judge Higginbotham is 
probably right.  I’m glad he expressed our fears.157 
Her suggestion that we “[g]ive the boy a chance” fails to consider the clearly 
defined views expressed by Thomas in his seminal law review article.158  If she 
had taken Thomas’s position into account, perhaps she had also taken into 
account his confirmation testimony that arguably discarded some or all of the 
views contained in that article.159  But perhaps her remarks portend a deeper 
claim, that there exists a dichotomy between her head and her heart, and that 
the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative has a claim on her heart but not necessarily 
on her head.  However, she never satisfactorily demonstrated this proposition.  
If anything, the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative speaks with equal force to both 
head and heart.160 
Professor Wilson careened back and forth between shared micro-
narratives, rooted in the personal experiences of both Thomas and herself, and 
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a broader macro-narrative that encompasses larger numbers of African-
Americans and their experiences and struggles over the preceding four or five 
decades that mark and measure the lives of both Thomas and herself.161  For 
her, the various forms of narrative proceeded on parallel tracks, neither 
speaking to the other in any meaningful way. 
Not surprisingly, Professor Wilson ultimately turned to Thomas’s micro-
narrative, surely a narrative of racial discrimination, poverty, obstacles in 
education and employment, and race, but also of an African-American man 
who “has become talented and well-trained.”162  From the perspective of this 
micro-narrative, she then posed the following questions: “Are we fair to 
require him to bear an extra burden of additional personal sacrifice because he 
was born Black in America?  Are we fair to deny him the opportunity to make 
his contribution in his own way, to live up to his own potential, to be his own 
person?”163  Again, she relied on Thomas’s micro-narrative, ignoring the Civil 
Rights Macro-Narrative.  “We can only encourage him to be honest to himself 
now that he no longer needs to please others.”164  When Judge Higginbotham 
referred to Thomas pleasing others, he had conservative whites in mind.165  
When Wilson referred to pleasing others she had no such limitation in mind.166  
For her, Justice Thomas has no more obligation to please African-Americans 
than he does to please anybody else.  Her translation of the “other” to be 
“pleased” negates the normative power of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. 
Unlike Higginbotham, who clearly wanted Thomas to emulate Marshall, 
Wilson took a different view. 
We cannot expect that his decisions would be those of Justice Marshall.  We 
can expect that he will vote in accordance with his own conscience and 
experience.  We should criticize Justice Thomas when we disagree with his 
decisions because he is a Supreme Court Justice and ought to do better.  We 
should not criticize him because he did not vote “Black.”167 
Professor Wilson left unanswered, however, the question as to how one 
determines what amounts to doing “better.”  Voting “Black” has to mean 
voting with the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative, the normative expression of the 
African-American struggle for equal rights, in mind.  Perhaps for her, 
therefore, doing “better” has no referent to the Narrative.  Perhaps this is so 
because the moral power of the Narrative reaches the heart but not the head of 
Professor Wilson.  But she offered up no alternative metaphor, narrative or 
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other moral, or other referent for measuring whether a particular vote is 
“good.”  She provided nothing that speaks to one’s head, to her head, or to 
Clarence Thomas’s head. 
But the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is essentially a narrative about the 
law precisely because of the central role of civil rights lawyers doing law in the 
construction of this particular macro-narrative.  To conclude that the Narrative 
is somehow irrelevant in analyzing judicial opinions, is to impoverish legal 
analysis to an extraordinary and unacceptable degree.  Professor Wilson has 
not established a normative or jurisprudential formalist position that would 
warrant the silencing of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative in the fashion that 
she supposed.  Trying to carve out a disembodied autonomy for Clarence 
Thomas—for accommodating his alienation—and for micro-narratives, she 
robbed the law of comprehensibility, not to mention moral authority.168 
Given her implicit rejection of any moral or normative claim of the 
Narrative, Wilson criticized Judge Higginbotham for recalling Clarence 
Thomas to a duty to remember those who helped him along the way, but not 
for recalling the other eight members of the Court to the same responsibility.169  
Professor Wilson overlooked the fact that Judge Higginbotham was engaging 
in an African-American discourse—one African-American judge speaking to 
another African- American judge.  The question posed by Judge Higginbotham 
was whether black people who wind up in a position to affect the legal 
relations of other black people have certain duties to those other black 
people.170  Surely one can answer this question, at least in large part, without 
also deciding what the duties of other people might or might not be.171 
In any event, Professor Wilson answered the question in the negative.  She 
concluded, “Justice Marshall . . . dedicated his life to creating options for 
Black Americans.  Justice Marshall fought for the right of Justice Thomas to 
determine his own destiny.  Perhaps Justice Thomas is a proper heir to Justice 
Marshall’s seat.”172  It boggles the mind to suppose that Justice Marshall would 
be satisfied if Clarence Thomas used the options that Marshall had fought to 
create to undo the legal and other protections necessary to ensure that those 
options remained available for other African-Americans, the poor, women, 
other minorities, and the subordinated.  It lies beyond belief that Justice 
Marshall would subscribe to the view that Clarence Thomas’s right to 
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determine his own destiny included the right to constrain the destiny of other 
African-Americans, the poor, women, other minorities, and the subordinated.  
Marshall surely believed in the moral force and power of the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative and the duties that it generates.  Thus it was folly then, and it 
is folly now to suppose that Justice Thomas might be a “proper heir to Justice 
Marshall’s seat.”173 
Because Professor Wilson rejected macro-narratives as relevant to judicial 
decision-making, she did not embrace the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.  
Her position rested largely on empowering Thomas’s micro-narrative.  Her 
treatment of the Counter-Narrative constitutes the only saving grace of 
Professor Wilson’s comment, although the rejection of the moral force of 
macro-narratives in doing law presents great obstacles to any rational analysis 
of the law.  In particular, it enshrines alienation, converting it merely to some 
expression or species of unbridled individualism. 
C. The Tobriner Lecture by the Judge 
Judge Higginbotham resumed his attack on Clarence Thomas in 1994,174 
prompted in part by the public response to his letter.175  He reiterated that his 
purpose in writing the letter was to state “what I felt his personal obligations 
were, both as a Justice on the Supreme Court and as an African-American.”176  
He then referred to the responses that questioned his authority to speak for 
black people on the character and qualifications of Justice Thomas.  Judge 
Higginbotham concluded that his authority came from his wife.177  Turning to 
Professor Wilson’s comments, Judge Higginbotham teased her for 
characterizing Thomas as a “boy.”178  He responded: 
Justice Thomas is not a mere boy.  Boys play marbles and little league 
baseball.  Men and women sit on the United States Supreme Court . . . .  It is 
because Justice Thomas has the power to determine the plight of all 
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Americans, and particularly the disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the 
powerless, that I wrote to him.  If he were a mere boy, I would have sent him a 
bag of marbles or a blank pad with crayons on which he could draw fantasies.  
I would not have feared that the destiny of our nation might in some instances 
rest on his decisive vote when the Court was evenly divided.179 
Professor Wilson undoubtedly meant to use the word “boy” in a jocular, if not 
flippant way, as Judge Higginbotham recognized.180  Higginbotham used her 
choice of words against her, correctly noting that the word “boy” connotes 
membership in the African-American family and thus, for him, a binding link 
to the shared experiences and thus the macro-narratives of that family, 
including the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.181  The metaphor or figure of 
“family” led Judge Higginbotham to pose the question whether Clarence 
Thomas had the moral right to become hostile to the very opportunities “that 
made his success possible” being seen as viable options for “the present 
generation of African-Americans, many of whom have found barriers to entry 
as high and impenetrable as any he encountered.”182  The answer to the Judge’s 
question turns largely on the recognition of the moral or normative claim of the 
Narrative.  For Professor Wilson, who rejected such a claim at least with 
regard to the “head,” Thomas presumably has such a moral right.  For Judge 
Higginbotham, who accepted such claims, Thomas does not.  The issue was 
clearly joined. 
Judge Higginbotham then responded to Wilson’s objection that he sought 
to impose a double standard, demanding of Thomas what he would not demand 
of the other members of the Court.  Higginbotham made a moral claim, one 
resting on the Narrative. 
I believe all Justices of the Supreme Court should be fair to everyone, and 
particularly in the “defense of the weak, the poor, minorities, women, the 
disabled, and the powerless.”  However, I do believe that it is a tragic irony 
when a Black Justice adopts the anti-minority position advocated by the most 
conservative and racially uninformed Justice on the Court, and when even 
many of his White colleagues demonstrate a far greater insight and concern 
about the history of the plight of African-Americans in this country.183 
 The assertion of “tragic irony” makes sense only if one supposes that the 
history of the struggle, the story of the struggle, as it constitutes a macro-
narrative, makes demands on those who belong to the community engaged in 
the struggle. 
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Judge Higginbotham zeroed in on Professor Wilson, arguing that “her 
writing suggests some confusion about the unavoidable obligation and status in 
life one has as an African-American—an obligation and status attributable to 
historic policies that have at various times been invoked by the overall 
American society.”184  He argued that the duty arises out of the “twoness” that 
Dubois described, being both an American and a Negro.185  Perhaps he meant 
to suggest that in African-Americans, Professor Wilson’s “head” of the 
American is conjoined with Professor Wilson’s “heart” of the Negro, the 
African.  But in any event, Judge Higginbotham placed the subject of moral 
duty squarely in the realm of psychology, linking not only head and heart, but 
also history or narrative and the psyche.  “The first sign of emotional 
maturity186 in all African-American public officials is the recognition of this 
duality that we all confront daily.”187  Judge Higginbotham had clearly 
ratcheted up his critique of Justice Thomas. 
Having introduced the subject of psychology and having declared that the 
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative contains a psychological dimension, 
Higginbotham bided his time.  He began a careful and cautious development of 
the subject by rephrasing or restating the theme of “tragic irony,” and at the 
same time, moving beyond it.  He said: 
I would hope that no African-American in high public office would become a 
major voice in the intentional destruction of the potential of his own people.  
No judge, whatever his race, should do that.  And if the person who engages in 
destructive conduct against a minority is also a member of a minority group 
that has been historically discriminated against, what is its special 
significance?188 
 Judge Higginbotham had now yoked the idea of ironic tragedy with the 
idea of destructive conduct, a conduct having special significance.  He 
explored that significance by considering what the consequences might have 
been if African-American judges had joined in the majority opinions in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford,189 and Plessy v. Ferguson.190  Those dire consequences only 
reinforced his harsh judgment on the works of Clarence Thomas as evidence of 
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destructive conduct.  “[A]t times, in his opinions, [Justice Thomas] is as 
conservative for this generation of the Supreme Court as were the majority of 
Justices who acted so hostilely to Blacks in Dred Scott and Plessy.  I think 
such extreme conservatism is a compounded irony when advocated by an 
African-American.”191  The complex dynamics of alienation are evident in 
Judge Higginbotham’s criticism of Thomas.  Whether or not Thomas might be 
a victim, he surely acts like a perpetrator. 
Judge Higginbotham was highly critical of Thomas’s dissent in Hudson v. 
McMillian, the case in which a black prisoner was severely beaten by prison 
guards and the question was whether such a beating constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.192  In light of 
Thomas’s view that there was no violation, Judge Higginbotham asked “[w]hy 
is he no different or probably even worse than many of the most conservative 
Supreme Court Justices of this century?”193 
By the time he delivered this lecture, unlike the case with the letter, Judge 
Higginbotham had Supreme Court opinions of Justice Thomas to scrutinize.  
His judgment of them was harsh, as his treatment of Hudson v. McMillian 
shows.  But the judge pressed ahead, developing and articulating not only a 
critique based on the moral meaning and significance of the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative, but also a critique that challenged the psyche of Justice 
Thomas.194  Judge Higginbotham concluded that Clarence Thomas might well 
be “entangled with racial self-hatred.”195  It was as if there could be no other 
explanation for the harsh, mean-spirited and reactionary views expressed by 
Clarence Thomas in his votes and opinions on the Court, and no other 
explanation for his destructive conduct. 
However, the two elements of Judge Higginbotham’s critique are linked 
together.  Rejection of the moral claims of the Narrative, a macro-narrative 
generated by the struggles, history, experience, hopes, and dreams of one’s 
own race, might be evidence of racial self-hatred and might give rise to 
destructive conduct.  This linkage in large part turns on the anterior assertion 
that the Narrative in fact carries with it binding moral and normative force on 
African-Americans, including Clarence Thomas, but also on the new assertion 
that acceptance of the normative power of the Narrative is evidence of a 
healthy racial self-identity. 
If Professor Wilson was right, then perhaps one could say that Thomas’s 
work on the Court merely reflects Thomas’s determination of his own 
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destiny,196 a destiny that is nowise connected to the destiny of other African-
Americans because there is no macro-narrative that can make a moral claim on 
African-Americans of the sort contended for by Judge Higginbotham.  One 
could also say that determining one’s own destiny in such a fashion does not 
necessarily evidence either racial self-hatred or racial self-identity or 
acceptance because macro-narratives bear no relation to psychological 
development.  Put differently, one could suppose that Clarence Thomas has 
discharged any duty that he might owe other blacks by determining his destiny 
according to his best lights, even while in doing so he harms black interests.  
However, history, this paper warrants, will cast a harsh judgment on those who 
view reality primarily through the lens of unconnected micro-narratives.197  
Equally telling, the notion that Justice Thomas is free to work out his own 
destiny entirely on his terms and entirely without reference to the Civil Rights 
Macro-Narrative overlooks the stubborn fact that the issue is not what one 
believes, but what one does and with whom one does it.  Clarence Thomas, the 
academic thinker, can hold whatever views he might want to, academic 
freedom guarantees this result.  However, Clarence Thomas, the Supreme 
Court Justice, presents an entirely different situation.  The Court, the third 
branch of our national government, is no ivory tower.198  Any proper analysis 
of Judge Higginbotham’s critique of Justice Thomas must take into account the 
functional difference between academia and the judiciary. 
D. The New York University Law School Speech by the Judge 
On November 21, 1995, Judge Higginbotham weighed in yet one more 
time.199  In a speech, he largely reprised his letter and his lecture.  But he 
pressed ahead with his attack on Clarence Thomas.200  First he sought to 
contrast Clarence Thomas and Colin Powell.201  Higginbotham was exploring 
the complex relation between macro-narratives and micro-narratives, 
demonstrating that one micro-narrative can reflect the Civil Rights Macro-
Narrative, Powell, whereas another can repudiate it, Thomas.202  He went 
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further to suggest that the former lacked the moral integrity or claim of the 
latter.203  He saw Powell leading America to a state of “greater justice and 
opportunity for all Americans,” whereas he saw Thomas as “dragging African-
Americans back to a past of oppression and inequality,” bemoaning how much 
worse off African-Americans and others are because of Thomas’s presence on 
the Court.204  Judge Higginbotham insisted that Thomas’s rise to power and 
influence was perhaps “less deserving” than Powell’s.205  He attacked, as he 
had done before, Thomas’s background, experience, and qualifications, but 
found Powell’s to be outstanding.206  He described both of them as social 
conservatives, but insisted that they have “profound philosophical differences” 
and quite different feelings about African-Americans.207 
On the nettlesome subject of affirmative action, Judge Higginbotham noted 
that Powell did not attack it even though doing so would have improved or 
enhanced his standing with whites.208  He declared that Powell was not like “an 
earlier generation of Uncle Toms.”  Instead, Powell acknowledged that he was 
helped by affirmative action, but was not shown preference.209  The judge 
reminded us that in 1983 Thomas acknowledged that he had benefited from 
affirmative action, but he concluded that Thomas was “impacted by the 
Reagan-Bush revolution” such that by 1988, Thomas was attacking affirmative 
action.210  He was particularly critical of Thomas’ brief concurring opinion in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, an opinion that restated the basic premise 
of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative that the Declaration of Independence 
is the governing source of meaning for the Equal Protection Clause. 211 
Returning to the theme of racial self-hatred, which increasingly had come 
to dominate his attack, Judge Higginbotham insisted that something had 
happened to the core of Justice Thomas’s soul; that he had forgotten from 
whence he had come.212  He declared that Thomas’s self-hatred was clinically 
observable.  Judge Higginbotham mocked Thomas, stating that Thomas must 
think that he would have been a confidant of Thomas Jefferson, the author of 
the Declaration of Independence, when in reality he would have been the 
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person “who fed his hogs, hoed his tobacco, and planted his corn.”213  
However, as Part VI of this paper will demonstrate, Thomas might have 
thought that Jefferson, like the vile Simon Legree, would have had a small 
number of black henchmen of the order of Quimbo and Sambo, and that he, 
Thomas, would have been one of them, a view that this author finds to be 
entirely plausible.  Thus Judge Higginbotham might have been wrong on this 
point.  But given his view, Judge Higginbotham wondered why Thomas would 
quote Jefferson, the slave master, as authority on the matter of affirmative 
action.  Judge Higginbotham, drawing on his lecture, repeated his criticism of 
Thomas’s attack on the very civil rights groups whose works had benefited 
Thomas.214 
Attesting again to the contemporary relevance of the Civil Rights Macro-
Narrative, the judge made use of then-recent developments.  He compared 
Thomas’s rejection of affirmative action with the September 1995 decision of 
Newt Gingrich, then the new Republican Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, to hire 64 pages, none of whom was an African-American and 
only one of whom was a racial minority.  In contrast, under the previous 
leadership in the House, twenty percent of the pages were minorities.215  Judge 
Higginbotham continued on with a somber assessment of the Congressional 
redistricting cases and the impact that those cases would, in his opinion, have 
on the number of African-Americans in the House of Representatives.216 
Given the structure of the Narrative, the story of the struggle for civil 
rights for African-Americans, Judge Higginbotham relished the fact that Colin 
Powell had attended the installation of a new head of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) at an overly long meeting in 
a black church in Washington, D.C.  The NAACP, of course, is one of the 
nation’s premier African-American civil rights organizations.  He argued that 
Thomas would never have attended such an event.217  Judge Higginbotham 
concluded his lengthy speech with the charge that Clarence Thomas was “the 
black clone,” an invention of racist, reactionary whites.218  He claimed that 
their strategy entailed finding someone who: (1) had been involved in the 
struggle, coming from a background of poverty; (2) would disregard his roots; 
(3) would be totally confused about self-identity, and (4) would exhibit some 
hostility to black women (Judge Higginbotham having Professor Anita Hill in 
mind).219  The reactionary whites found Clarence Thomas in the view of Judge 
Higginbotham. 
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E. The Article by a Second Law Professor 
Professor Wilson found an ally in Professor Randall Kennedy.  He joined 
the lists to attack the idea that a moral predicate exists for the claim of racial 
loyalty, the predicate for Judge Higginbotham’s criticism of Clarence 
Thomas.220  Professor Kennedy made the categorical assertion that the 
argument for racial loyalty is internal to black elite circles.221  Concededly, the 
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative demands racial loyalty, or at least, Judge 
Higginbotham would avow that it does.  Professor Kennedy, however, offered 
no evidence that only black elites react to or contemplate the meaning of the 
Narrative.  Indeed, there is good reason to think black people generally pay 
attention to and are influenced by the Narrative.222  It is clear Professor 
Kennedy sought to limit the reach and scope of the Narrative, claiming it to be 
the plaything of the black elite.  He did not resort to the “head-heart” 
dichotomy of Professor Wilson.223 
He did, however, correctly note that the racial disloyalty charge aims most 
powerfully at African-American lawyers in general and at Clarence Thomas in 
particular,224 a tribute to the elemental power and force of the work of civil 
rights lawyers and civil rights organizations in the African-American struggle 
for equal justice and a testimony to the central components of the Narrative.  
Thus, “in the eyes of his most bitter detractors, Thomas is worse than a 
[George] Wallace [at his white supremacist worst] since Thomas is a race 
traitor and not simply an enemy.”225  Professor Kennedy failed, apparently, to 
consider the logic behind the relative intensity of the attacks on Clarence 
Thomas.  The other racial disloyalty targets—all lawyers, specifically, Vernon 
Jordan, Jr., Christopher Darden, and Anthony Griffin—lack the power to 
impact the lives of African-Americans that Clarence Thomas (lawyer and now 
Supreme Court Justice) possesses. 226 
Kennedy insisted the racial disloyalty critique exhibited “a tendency to 
homogenize blacks, woefully minimizing the complex, contentious diversity 
that marks the African-American population.”227  In Part IV, this article will 
demonstrate that Professor Kennedy is simply wrong on the facts—African-
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Americans from a variety of ideological perspectives condemn and reject the 
conservatism of Clarence Thomas.228  Furthermore, while there is an African-
American conservative ideological tradition, today it claims the allegiance of 
only a handful of African-Americans,229 and it has no institutional or structural 
support or presence in and with African-Americans.230  The racial disloyalty 
critique neither homogenizes blacks nor does it minimize “the complex, 
contentious diversity that marks the African-American population”231 because 
the overwhelming majority of African-Americans, perhaps as great as ninety-
nine percent, do not accept Clarence Thomas’s conservative ideology, and a 
sizeable minority dislikes it.232  Thus Kennedy’s claim that “Thomas’s brand 
of conservatism, though by no means dominant, is by no means scarce in black 
America”233 goes against the evidence, unless one were to grant that a political 
ideology adhered to by one percent of the African-American population was 
not “scarce,” or that a ninety-nine to one split constituted a “division.”234 
Professor Kennedy stood on surer ground when he noted, with respect to 
social conservatism, that Thomas had soul mates in the African-American 
communities.235  However, Part IV of this article will show social 
conservatism enjoys far more support among African-Americans than either 
economic or racial conservatism.236  It comes as no surprise that the criticism 
of Clarence Thomas focuses largely on race questions, as it surely did in the 
hands of Judge Higginbotham.  Therefore, Kennedy’s argument regarding 
social conservatism is of no avail. 
Because African-American critics of Clarence Thomas can embrace a wide 
range of political ideologies, Professor Kennedy’s argument that “[t]he racial 
disloyalty critique makes the erroneous assumption that it is clear what policies 
best serve the interests of black communities” cannot stand.237  But Professor 
Kennedy continued: 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to discern what effect policies will have on 
blacks across regions, classes, genders, and other significant social 
stratifications.  Making wise decisions is not simply a matter of wanting to be 
loyal to one’s people.  It is a matter of knowing facts, interpreting trends, 
making use of proper values, comparing arguments, and sometimes reaching 
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counterintuitive conclusions that are at odds with conventional understandings.  
Arbiters of racial loyalty err when they suggest that affirmative action, racial 
gerrymandering, and similar strategies are obviously and unquestionably the 
best policies for blacks to pursue.  Perhaps they are the best available.  But one 
cannot be confident of that conclusion absent reconsideration and 
experimentation with alternatives—just the sort of open-minded testing that is 
inhibited when a failure to embrace these strategies gives rise to charges of 
“selling out,” “forgetting where you came from,” or “turning your back on 
your people.”238 
Professor Kennedy here has posed a fair challenge to the civil rights 
community, and thus to those—elites or otherwise—who control and shape the 
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.  But, given Clarence Thomas’s rigid formalism 
and commitment to “original intent,” 239 it is difficult to see just how Thomas’s 
narrative-pathic jurisprudence240 responds to or bears any relation to 
Kennedy’s call for a functionalist approach to working on large social and 
racial legal problems. 
If anything, Professor Kennedy gave us yet one more reason to criticize 
Clarence Thomas.  Thomas makes no effort “to discern what effect policies 
will have on blacks across regions, classes, genders, and other significant 
social stratifications.”241  He makes precious little effort to “know[] facts, 
interpret[] trends, mak[e] use of proper values, [or] compar[e] arguments.”242  
It will not do to suggest that Thomas might reach “counterintuitive conclusions 
that are at odds with conventional understandings” when the very methods he 
uses to reach those conclusions are highly suspect.243  With Thomas we do not 
get “open-minded testing.”244  Three examples, all involving affirmative 
action, which Thomas opposes, will suffice. 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Peña,245 Thomas’s concurring opinion is 
terse, rigid, and formalist in the extreme.  It makes no effort to connect his 
views with empirical social reality.  He made nothing more than the following 
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series of categorical claims: (1) “[g]overnment cannot make us equal; it can 
only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law;”246 (2) “[t]hat 
these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot 
provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government 
may not make distinctions on the basis of race;”247 (3) “[t]here can be no doubt 
that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war 
with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our 
Constitution;”248 (4) “[t]hese programs . . . undermine the moral basis of the 
equal protection principle . . . [a] principle [that] reflects our Nation’s 
understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on 
the individual and our society;”249 (5) “there can be no doubt that racial 
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and 
pernicious as any other form of discrimination;”250 (6) this paternalism 
“teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, 
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence” 
and “[i]nevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, 
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have 
been wronged by the government’s use of race,”251 and (7) “[t]hese programs 
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop 
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”252  
Thomas cited no empirical social research to buttress any of these highly 
contestable categorical claims that he makes.  To take just one of these claims, 
there is solid evidence that the stigma to which Thomas referred in claim seven 
is largely a figment of his imagination.253 
Thomas fared no better in Missouri v. Jenkins, where he made a series of 
claims that are abstract and not rooted in anything other than Thomas’s view of 
the world. 254  He began with the remarkable statement that “[i]t never ceases 
to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume  that anything that is 
predominantly black must be inferior.”255  Unfortunately, he never bothered to 
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explain just what that “anything” might be.  The only “thing” we know for sure 
is that a majority of the students in the Kansas City, Missouri public schools 
were African-Americans.256  We do not know the racial make-up of the 
faculty, the administrators, or those who determine how much money the 
school district would receive in any fiscal year. 
Undaunted, Thomas charged ahead, arguing that the District Court had 
“read our cases to support the theory that black students suffer an unspecified 
psychological harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational 
development.  This approach not only relies upon questionable social science 
research rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assumption 
of black inferiority.”257  Thomas thus made it perfectly clear that he rejected 
empirical research, preferring instead to rely on what he supposed to be 
“constitutional principle.”  He went so far as to state, “assumptions [of racial 
inferiority in situations of de facto segregation and any social science research 
upon which they rely certainly cannot form the basis upon which we decide 
matters of constitutional principle.”258  However, when it suited his purposes, 
Thomas was prepared to rely on his private untutored intuition: “The 
continuing ‘racial isolation’ of schools after de jure segregation has ended may 
well reflect voluntary housing choices or other private decisions.”259  There is 
too much hard evidence of continuing residential racial apartheid in this 
country, a state of affairs resulting from concerted action to restrict housing 
choices for African-Americans,260 for anybody to take Thomas’s intuition or 
hunch seriously.  Nonetheless, Thomas concluded “massive demographic 
shifts” lay “beyond the authority and . . . the practical ability of the federal 
courts to try to counteract.”261  Again, Thomas indulged in armchair psychiatry 
when he declared that the Kansas City public schools “can function as the 
center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent 
black leadership, success, and achievement.”262  Here too, Thomas chose not to 
back up this claim with any empirical research or support.  Finally Thomas 
trumpeted the unsubstantiated and unsupported claim that “‘[r]acial isolation’ 
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itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is . . . . [Because otherwise 
one would have to insist that] there must be something inferior about 
blacks.”263  This claim is highly debatable because there is good evidence that 
racial isolation does in fact harm African-Americans.264 
Finally, in Grutter v. Bollinger,265 Thomas appeared to depart from the arid 
formalism of Adarand and Jenkins.  In his lengthy dissenting opinion, he 
appears to rely on some statistical data and other forms of empirical data to 
support his arguments against affirmative action.266  Accordingly, he appeared 
to have moved in the direction Professor Kennedy supposed, however, the 
Justice did not.  Thomas argued that because some states do not have a public 
law school then a presumption arises “that the enterprise itself is not a 
compelling state interest.”267  However, Thomas never explained why State A 
could not, as a practical matter, meet its need for lawyers through the public 
law schools of State B.  Thomas forged ahead and argued the fact that “[l]ess 
than 16% of the [University of Michigan] Law School’s graduating class elects 
to stay in Michigan after law school”268 militates against any claim that the law 
school serves a compelling state interest.  Thomas utterly failed to consider, 
however, what percentage of the minority graduates of the law school elected 
to stay in Michigan.  He also relied on the statistical fact that only a few states 
maintain elite public law schools to “raise[] a strong inference that there is 
nothing compelling about elite status.”269  Thomas, again, failed to consider 
that some states might not feel the need to benefit from the prestige that an 
elite public law school might confer upon it.  He never established the general 
proposition that a compelling state interest must find expression in every state 
in order to be compelling.  If this were not bad enough, Thomas never 
connected elitism with affirmative action.  The hard fact is that non-elite law 
schools practice affirmative action too.  So far, Thomas has not handled spotty, 
empirical data particularly well. 
Thomas would appear to be on firmer methodological ground when he 
argued that there is growing social evidence “that racial (and other sorts) of 
heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students.”270  The thrust 
of the argument Thomas constructed was that African-Americans do better 
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academically in black schools than they do in white schools.271  What Thomas 
failed to consider, whether or not studies on which he relied do, is the life 
histories and the numerical credentials of the black students analyzed in these 
reports and the academic environments of the schools they attend.  For 
example, one has to consider whether white racism contributes to African-
American underachievement in some white schools.  Thomas’s failure to 
appreciate the need to contextualize the findings on academic achievement 
suggests either an inability or an unwillingness on his part to do good social 
science.  Thomas insisted that Boalt Hall has an underrepresented minority 
student enrollment that “now exceeds 1996 levels.”272  But the relevant 
question is, but for California Proposition 209, what would that enrollment be?  
One way to think about the question is to ask why 171 American law deans 
supported the University of Michigan Law School’s position on affirmative 
action?273  This suggests that Thomas failed to appreciate the reality of the 
situation at Berkeley, a reality that was more apparent to virtually all of the 
deans of American law schools, elite or otherwise. 
Thomas returned to his large theme that affirmative action is bad for 
African-Americans,  that black students are better off if they are not 
“overmatched” in white schools.274  He relied on Stephan and Abigail 
Thernstrom’s Reflections on the Shape of the River as authority for the 
proposition that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are underperforming in 
the classroom.275 He also referred to Thomas Sowell,276 but Thomas essentially 
struck out on his own without any real need for either the Thernstroms or 
Sowell.  He had it all figured out; he accused law schools of “seek[ing] only a 
facade” of “tantaliz[ing] unprepared students . . . [who] take the bait, only to 
find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.”277  There is 
evidence, of course, that this is flatly wrong.278  And on the question of stigma, 
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Thomas reverted to the same sort of barren, sterile, and self-serving categorical 
claims that he advanced in Adarand and Jenkins, citing no social science 
whatsoever in support of his claim that blacks admitted to law school, whether 
or not because of affirmative action (what Thomas calls “discrimination”), are 
“tarred as undeserving.”279  Nothing in Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, therefore, 
demonstrates any real change in the methodological approach first displayed in 
Adarand. 
Even if this analysis of three of Thomas’s anti-affirmative action opinions 
fails to settle the matter, Professor Kennedy did not explain how adopting the 
agenda of the most reactionary whites, whites who, demonstrably throughout 
our nation’s history, have stood athwart the goals and objectives of the vast 
majority of African-Americans, is merely “counterintuitive.”280  The burden 
lies on those whites to demonstrate a commitment to the African-American 
agenda, the struggle for equal justice, a commitment that they have utterly 
failed to make.  In the event some of them have made such a commitment, 
Professor Kennedy should have demonstrated that fact. 
Professor Kennedy contended that critique “takes the form of alleging that 
[Thomas] mouths conservative opinions to curry favor with powerful whites or 
out of a mere habit of following such conservative ideologues as his colleague 
Antonin Scalia.”281  The point, however, is trivial.  If Thomas is guilty of racial 
disloyalty, then it would stand to reason that he might wish to curry favor with 
powerful whites if he were to curry favor with anybody.  Kennedy continued 
by arguing that the critique negates “[t]he one possibility . . . that a thoughtful 
black person could, on his own, with sincerity, believe what Clarence Thomas 
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says that he believes.”282  But this point is equally trivial.  Clarence Thomas, as 
a member of the Court, does more than merely “believe,” sincerely or not.  He 
also acts, and he does so with a great deal of power and authority in league 
with the most reactionary members of the Court, and it is his actions, his 
exercise of power, and his alliances that outrage many African-Americans, not 
merely his beliefs. 
Kennedy saw that micro-narratives could not carry the weight that 
Professor Wilson thought that they could.  He tried, therefore, to create another 
macro-narrative to function either as a correction to or a limitation on the Civil 
Rights Macro-Narrative.  Kennedy, however, did not seek to use the Counter-
Narrative.  He attempted to link Thomas to “such figures as Booker T. 
Washington, Kelly Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas 
Sowell.”283  Black conservatives do in fact have “deep roots in Afro-American 
history,” as Kennedy argued,284 but the point is trivial.  Not only is their 
political ideology embraced by only a small number of African-Americans, it 
is by no means evident that the thinkers Kennedy identified would agree with 
Thomas’s acts, votes, opinions, and alliances on the Court.285 
One need not merely speculate on the matter.  As Judge Higginbotham 
demonstrated in his speech, Colin Powell has made the case for affirmative 
action, understood as equal opportunity without preferential treatment.286  On 
this point, Colin Powell and Thurgood Marshall stand as one.  Justice Marshall 
never referred to affirmative action as a “preference.”  Instead, he invariably 
characterized it as a remedy to correct past racial injustice.287  J. C. Watts, the 
reliably conservative former Republican Congressman from Oklahoma,288 
began his career in the House of Representatives wanting to “slow down the 
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Republican train” designed to end or derail affirmative action.289  Watts agreed 
philosophically with conservative critics of affirmative action, but wanted to 
avoid a “war between men and women, black and white.”290  Watts’s views 
have remained largely the same over time.  Thus, while still opposed to 
affirmative action, he continued to oppose its abolition.  He joined with the 
liberal African-American Democratic Congressman John Lewis of Georgia, 
thus echoing the nexus or link between Colin Powell and Thurgood Marshall, 
to declare that “[t]his is not the time to eliminate the one tool we have—
imperfect though it may be—to help level the playing field for many minority 
youth.”291  Watts “has flatly criticized affirmative action in public forums . . . .  
But he also is unsparing in his assessment of GOP leaders, arguing that they 
cannot afford to abolish affirmative action without first taking substantive 
steps to reach out to blacks.”292  On the other hand, Clarence Thomas has been 
unsparing in his criticism of affirmative action and has consistently voted to 
strike it down in the cases coming before the Court.293  Given the position of 
conservatives like Powell and Watts, it does not follow that Booker T. 
Washington, Kelly Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas 
Sowell—all African-American conservatives—would agree with Justice 
Thomas on the question of affirmative action.294  Most of them died, after all, 
before affirmative action emerged.  Professor Kennedy’s attempt to link 
Clarence Thomas with other African-American conservatives to construct a 
competing macro-narrative collapses. 
The flaw in Professor Kennedy’s analysis on this point is both large and 
deep.  One could oppose affirmative action and seek to have Congress 
eliminate it—a position more extreme than Congressman Watts’s view—and 
still not agree with Justice Thomas’s votes to abolish affirmative action.  One 
could object to affirmative action on prudential grounds but still uphold it in 
 
 289. Kevin Merida, Within GOP, Conflicts on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 29, 
1995, at A4. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Juliet Eilperin, Watts Walks a Tightrope on Affirmative Action, and the House GOP 
Follows, WASH. POST, May 12, 1998, at A17. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  See also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 294. Thomas Sowell criticizes affirmative action as much as Clarence Thomas does and 
would undoubtedly vote, were he on the Court, the same way that Justice Thomas does.  See 
THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES (1972); THOMAS SOWELL, 
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990).  One cannot say the same about any of the other 
previously mentioned African-American conservatives.  Indeed, in the case of Booker T. 
Washington, he secretly supported civil rights litigation seeking remedies and outcomes that 
Clarence Thomas presumably would oppose.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:327 
the face of a judicial challenge raising constitutional objections to affirmative 
action.295  One could object to affirmative action on philosophical grounds but 
still uphold it in the face of judicial challenges on the ground that the 
Constitution gives Congress the right to be wrong on affirmative action, and 
thus the courts should not interfere with Congressional decision-making 
regarding affirmative action because the separation of powers gives Congress 
the right to find the social facts on which affirmative action arguably rests.296  
Principled conservatives, African-American or otherwise, could take either or 
both of these positions.297 
Professor Kennedy then argued that the racial disloyalty claim fuels “the 
suspicion that a successful black person obtained his or her success necessarily 
through opportunism or the indulgence of white folks or by serving as a front 
for white puppeteers who call the shots.”298  Part VI of this article will 
demonstrate that Professor Kennedy overreached.  Black people are able to 
distinguish between those members of the race who succeeded by selling out 
the race and those who did not, as the world of Uncle Tom’s Cabin illustrates.  
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He also insisted that the racial disloyalty critique runs the risk of a boomerang, 
driving the targets into precisely the beliefs and actions complained of.299  But 
whatever the merits of the claim might be, it does not apply to Clarence 
Thomas.  His “reflexive conservatism”300 was on display both before and after 
his nomination and confirmation.301  Professor Kennedy failed to show that, 
somehow, attacks leveled on Clarence Thomas in the 1980s produced any 
supposed “boomerang.” 
Finally, Professor Kennedy expressed his admiration for the courage of 
Justice Thomas in confronting his African-American critics at the 1998 annual 
meeting of the National Bar Association.302  Kennedy reminded us that 
Thomas declared on that occasion that “I am . . . a black man” with the “right 
to think for myself,” refusing “to have my ideas assigned to me as though I 
was an intellectual slave because I’m black.”303  At least the Justice joined the 
issue.  The moral claim of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative does not make 
“intellectual slaves.”  Like Thomas’s assertion that the Senate hearings 
addressing the charges filed by Professor Anita Hill amounted to a “high-tech 
lynching,”304 the rhetorical flourish and flair of a supposed “intellectual 
slavery” is flashy, but it misleads.  Just as the only lynching that took place 
during the confirmation hearings happened to Professor Hill, so too the only 
slavery at issue here is the condition of the black inmate who was beaten by 
prison guards, or of the innumerable qualified African-American prospective 
students, employees and contractors, vendors and suppliers, and political 
leaders who will find their life choices diminished by the views of a narrow 
reactionary majority on the Court that is bent on turning the racial progress 
clock back—a majority in which Thomas is a member in good standing.  
Justice Thomas might have had a passable argument if his jurisprudence was 
functionalist, that is, a theory of law that placed maximum emphasis on the 
myriad of facts and narratives that are the sum and substance of a law case.  He 
might have had a passable argument if he could have demonstrated that he has 
engaged in precisely the complex balancing and weighing process called for by 
Professor Kennedy, and having done so, concluded that the approach of the 
most reactionary whites would nonetheless benefit African-Americans in their 
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quest for equal justice.  But of course Justice Thomas has no credible argument 
on this score, and neither does Professor Kennedy. 
F. The Tribute by the Law Clerk (now Himself a Law Professor) 
Unlike Professors Wilson and Kennedy, Stephen F. Smith enthusiastically 
embraced and embellished the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.305  He took 
the fight to Judge Higginbotham with fury and gusto.306  He pointed out that 
“some in the civil rights community had hoped [that Judge Higginbotham] 
would succeed the late Justice Thurgood Marshall,”307 a hard, but fair 
comment.  Smith wrote: 
[T]he relentless assaults on the Justice are part and parcel of a larger struggle 
for the hearts and minds of black America, a veritable last gasp of those who 
have traditionally viewed themselves as leaders of the black community to 
maintain their hold on power and of the liberal Democrats to maintain control 
over their core constituency.308 
Smith accused Judge Higginbotham of unleashing in the speech “a bitter and 
intensely personal attack on the Justice,”309 and a savage attack on “the 
Justice’s status as a black man.”310  Thomas, by contrast “personifies the rise of 
black conservatism in America.”311  Furthermore, [Thomas] should be a source 
of great pride to black Americans and also a source of hope that the failed 
policies of the past will be replaced by a future in which black Americans, 
freed from the restraints of victimology and poverty, will be able to realize 
their full potential in America.312  Smith had made his political agenda quite 
clear. 
But he did engage Judge Higginbotham on the question of macro-
narratives, burnishing, as noted above,313 the Color-Blindness Macro-
Narrative.  He also invested it with a supposed moral force, stating that “it was 
the legal and moral principle of colorblindness that freed blacks from the 
shackles of slavery and lifted the dark veil of segregation.”314  But this is a silly 
argument, given the fact that the very black people who struggled to free and 
lift people like Thurgood Marshall, never elevated colorblindness to the level 
of first principle.315 
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Smith made common cause with Professor Kennedy in arguing that some 
of Thomas’s most controversial opinions either did not in fact harm black 
interests, or in fact furthered those interests.316  In so doing, Smith 
unsuccessfully sought to locate the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative in the 
African-American community. 
With regard to Hudson v. McMillian,317 Smith insisted that the record of 
the case does not establish that the prisoner who was beaten was black.318  
However, because a disproportionate percentage of prisoners in America are 
African-Americans, Smith’s point falls to the ground.  With respect to the 
voting rights cases, Smith made the argument that there have been only 
“isolated instances of racially polarized voting in recent years,”319 surely a 
debatable proposition.320  Indeed the 2000 presidential election stands as a 
monument to persistent racially-polarized voting.321  On the matter of 
affirmative action, Smith made the stock conservative argument that 
affirmative action is bad because it stigmatizes the supposed beneficiaries of 
the program.322  This is a particularly egregious argument for Smith to offer up 
because Smith claimed that “[p]sychological injury or benefit is irrelevant”323 
in the context of Brown v. Board of Education,324 but, mirabile dictu, becomes 
relevant in analyzing the impact of affirmative action.  Finally, in connection 
with school desegregation, Smith argued that coerced busing “has arguably 
hurt black students in their formative years by taking them out of the very 
schools that ‘can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and 
provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and 
achievement.’”325  Leaving aside Smith’s and Thomas’s disingenuous appeals 
to psychology here, this argument fares no better because black people were 
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not in charge of the school system at issue in any meaningful sense of the 
word.  The role of the State of Missouri in Missouri v. Jenkins326 in presiding 
over a racially biased school system, not that of black people, constituted the 
central issue in that protracted litigation.  One need only ask whether African-
Americans in fact control urban school systems, have access to adequate 
financial resources, and are free to choose the teachers and to design programs 
and policies that take the circumstances of urban black students into 
account.327  So much for “independent black leadership, success, and 
achievement.” 
G. Some Concluding Thoughts 
Judge Higginbotham and Smith represent the extremes in the encounter 
discussed previously.  Each one sought to have his preferred macro-narrative 
control the discourse.  Few macro-narratives could be as diametrically opposed 
as the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative and the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative, 
hence the debate became, for want of a better word, intense.  This left some 
room for Professors Wilson and Kennedy to maneuver.  Each sought to limit 
the reach of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative without embracing the Counter-
Narrative.  They sought to take a more moderate position than had Judge 
Higginbotham.  They also sought to minimize, or downplay, Thomas’s 
alienation from black people.  Their strategies failed largely because their 
limiting principles do not hold up under close scrutiny. 
The central problem concerns the relation between black conservatism, a 
subject that Part IV of this article addresses, and alienation from black people.  
Judge Higginbotham sought to define black conservatism with reference to the 
relative moderation of Colin Powell on the question of affirmative action.  He 
sought to place Powell squarely in the civil rights tradition as it now exists, to 
place him in the Narrative.  Smith sought to place black conservatism in a 
different macro-narrative, one radically opposed to the macro-narratives of the 
civil rights community.  While he sought to place the Counter-Narrative in the 
African-American political and philosophical traditions, he, like Thomas 
himself, could not come to grips with its contextualism and could not show 
that identifiable black conservatives in African-American history would agree 
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with Thomas’s votes.  Smith also sought to draft the civil rights community 
itself into the service of the Counter-Narrative, the mirror image, one supposes, 
of Judge Higginbotham’s attempt to draft Colin Powell into the service of the 
Civil Rights Macro-Narrative.  At least with respect to affirmative action, 
however, Higginbotham’s draft succeeded and Smith’s failed.  Powell has 
made it clear that he supports at least one vision, or version, of affirmative 
action, a view that Marshall embraced.328  Smith could not explain how 
Thurgood Marshall could make the arguments he did in Brown v. Board of 
Education,329 and yet vote the way that he did in the affirmative action cases.  
Indeed, Smith did not even try. 
Wilson and Kennedy also sought to place black conservatism in the 
African-American community but did so in ways that might leave black 
conservatism more firmly connected to the views of others in the community, 
to make it part of the family, so to speak, and thus less the domain of the 
alienated.  They eschewed the attempt to turn Thurgood Marshall into a 
onetime apostle of colorblindness.  But they sought to add Thomas into the 
company of black conservatism as they had constructed it.  Wilson argued for 
the autonomy of the “head” even as the “heart” was dominated by the 
Narrative.  Her approach defines conservatism as a “head” matter, a difficult 
proposition to defend in the abstract, and maybe not even in more concrete, 
historical terms.  Kennedy sought to tie, or link, Thomas to a number of 
historical personages who populate the small world of black conservatism, but 
his efforts failed because he could not show, as Smith could not, that the black 
conservatives to whom he referred would have agreed with Thomas’s votes on 
the Court.  Black conservatism, obviously, is problematic for a variety of 
reasons.  This article takes them up in Part IV. 
Law professors—both the full-time and the part-time variety—have shaped 
the foregoing discourse.  Of some interest, law professors continue to protest 
and to struggle against Clarence Thomas and his works.  For example, 
Clarence Thomas had been invited to spend a day with students and faculty at 
the University of North Carolina School of Law at Chapel Hill.330  However, 
the African-American faculty of the school boycotted the appearance.  In a 
statement dated February 28, 2002, they reaffirmed the salience of race in 
American life, and thus disavowed the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.331  
They pointed out that Thomas appealed to race when he “declared himself the 
victim of a ‘high-tech lynching’ during the heated opposition to his 
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appointment to the Supreme Court.”332  They argued that the problem with 
Thomas is not merely his beliefs, but his votes, votes “inevitably linked to 
those of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and 
Kennedy. . . . [H]e has provided the critical fifth vote in a number of decisions 
that set back the quest for racial equality and social justice in this country.”333  
They declared that “we know that society is now more closed, more hateful, 
less democratic, and less just than it could be if only Justice Thomas’s deciding 
fifth vote were cast, even some of the time, with the four justices who 
generally dissent from his majority colleagues.”334  They concluded by stating 
that they would “not participate in any institutional gesture that honors and 
endorses what Justice Thomas does.  We cannot delight in such a day.  
Therefore, while away from the day’s events that will honor Justice Thomas, 
we will re-read Judge Higginbotham’s letter . . . .”335 
Alienation is surely abroad in the land, as the spectacle of such a boycott 
clearly demonstrates.  One cannot seriously argue that Charles E. Daye, 
Marilyn V. Yarbrough, John O. Calmore, Adrienne D. Davis, and Kevin V. 
Haynes are alienated from the African-American community.  But one could 
say, as “the UNC Five” suggest, and as I suspect, the vast majority of African-
American law professors might say, that it is Clarence Thomas who stands 
apart from that community.336 
IV.  AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: MICHAEL G. DAWSON’S 
BLACK VISIONS 
Professor Dawson has written the definitive work on the nature, character, 
and substantive content of African-American political ideologies.337  His major 
conclusion is that “six distinct political ideologies . . . have evolved as a result 
of the continued ideological conflict which has been a constant feature of black 
politics since at least the early nineteenth century.”338  But these ideologies 
grew out of “an African-American world view in which the moral, spiritual, 
and material development of the community is at least as important as the 
development of the individual.”339  And “[a] communal approach to politics 
continues to influence African-American political life.”340  But “[n]either the 
 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. (referring to Open Letter, supra note 27). 
 336. For a thoughtful treatment of the boycott, and an analysis of Clarence Thomas that 
shares many themes with this paper, see Calmore, supra note 3. 
 337. See DAWSON, supra note 98. 
 338. Id. at 10. 
 339. Id. at 11. 
 340. Id.  See also WILSON JEREMIAH MOSES, BLACK MESSIAHS AND UNCLE TOMS: SOCIAL 
AND LITERARY MANIPULATIONS OF A RELIGIOUS MYTH, at vii (rev. ed. 1993) (stating that “[o]ne 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER? YES 381 
communal nature of black politics nor the strong sense of the majority of 
blacks that their fate is linked to that of the race prevent political conflict from 
raging within black communities.”341  Dawson identifies six ideological 
groupings: “the radical egalitarian, disillusioned liberal, black Marxist, black 
nationalist, black feminist, and black conservative342 ideologies.”343  Radical 
egalitarianism, one of three strands of black liberalism,344 calls for: 
[A] strong central state which promotes equality combined with respect for 
individual liberty and self-reliance.  Capitalism is criticized but considered 
reformable.  Racism is seen as a vile ideology that will disappear after 
vigorous debate and social action demonstrate the untruthfulness and  moral 
bankruptcy of its basic principles and assumptions.  Alliances with all other 
people of good will, including white Americans, are considered vital to the 
quest for racial justice and achievable through a variety of mechanisms, 
including scientific explanation and moral suasion.  The use of violence, 
except in self-defense, is rejected.345 
Radical egalitarianism demands “equality,” not “liberty,” as the central goal or 
objective, of its activism and protest.346  Notwithstanding its assimilationist 
ethic, radical egalitarianism recognizes the need for black autonomy and that 
black institutions are “necessary for self-development.”347 
Disillusioned liberalism, the second strand of black liberalism, constitutes 
an unstable348 political ideology, a temporary refuge for formerly optimistic 
radical egalitarians who have since lost hope in the ability of white America to 
accept or move towards racial justice and equality.349  Notable examples of 
African-Americans who moved from radical egalitarianism to disillusioned 
liberalism include Ralph Bunche, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee activists.350  The doctrinal or 
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programmatic difference between radical egalitarianism and disillusioned 
liberalism lies primarily in the focus or emphasis of the latter “on building the 
political and economic power of the black community as part of the strategy 
for gaining equality and admission into American society.”351  The former, 
consistent with its optimism, places great weight on building alliances with 
non-African-Americans.352 
Black Marxism, an anti-liberal ideology, has in recent years “moved to the 
right toward a more social democratic orientation.”353  It is a radical ideology 
that, like other forms of Marxism, emphasizes “the central role of the capitalist 
system.”354  But “black Marxism also emphasizes race as a fundamental 
[analytical] category and spirituality to a degree not found in traditional Euro-
American Marxism.”355  Whatever importance this ideology might have had in 
the past, it is no longer “a mass force.”356 
Black conservatism, the last of the three strands of black liberalism, has 
“remarkably little mass support.”357  There is some evidence of support on 
social issues,358 but not on racial or economic issues.  Black conservatives are 
staunch advocates of libertarian capitalism,359 denigrate the older generation of 
black leadership,360 and seek to replace it with conservative moral 
leadership.361  On the matter of race, black conservatives stress the theme of 
black uplift, or self-improvement, but do not link it to white racism as other 
African-American political ideologies do.  Thus, “[t]he problem, argues 
[Glenn] Loury, is not the racist attitudes of whites, for ‘blacks’ problems lie 
not in the heads of white people but rather in the wasted and incompletely 
fulfilled lives of too many black people.”362  In a similar vein, they tend to 
downplay the legacy of racism, arguing that blacks should stop acting like 
victims.363  African-American conservatives rail against the evil state, 
preferring self-reliance and taking advantage of the market.364  They rebel 
against black communitarian norms of authenticity,365 and following their 
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views regarding racial uplift and legacy, argue that blacks should conform to 
white opinions and sensibilities.366 
Black feminism focuses on “the intersection of gender with race and class” 
as the normative analytical construct for understanding the situation of 
African-American women.367  Black feminists “see themselves as struggling 
against both patriarchy and white supremacy. . . . [They] are especially critical 
of ideologies which include as core elements claims about the ‘natural’ 
leadership role of black men and contain essentialized views of gender 
roles.”368 
Black nationalism emphasizes “African-American autonomy and various 
degrees of cultural, social, economic, and political separation from white 
America.  Race is seen as the fundamental category for analyzing society, and 
America is seen as fundamentally racist.”369  Community nationalism, now the 
most prevalent form of black nationalism, stresses both equality and 
“nation.”370  However, it “is not attached to integrationism, and rejects 
assimilation.”371  Community nationalism emphasizes black economic 
development, but does not altogether dismiss black politics.372  It supports 
“affirmative action and antidiscrimination programs.”373  It limits, however, 
the leading roles to men, never defining the role of African-American 
women.374 
The six ideologies overlap in complex ways.  Dawson mapped the linkages 
between them, showing that radical egalitarianism, the oldest of the six, 
maintains strong ties with disillusioned liberalism and black social democracy 
(the successor to black Marxism), a moderate tie with black feminism, a weak 
tie with community nationalism, and no tie at all with black conservatism.  
Disillusioned liberalism has a strong connection with community nationalism 
and a moderate linkage with black social democracy.  It has no connections 
with black feminism or with black conservatism.  Black social democracy has 
a moderate tie with black feminism and a weak one with community 
nationalism.  It maintains no linkages with black conservatism.  Black 
conservatism has a moderate tie with community nationalism.  It has no 
connections with black feminism.  Black feminism maintains a weak tie with 
community nationalism.  Community nationalism has ties of varying strength 
or degree with all of the other African-American political ideologies.  Radical 
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egalitarianism, disillusioned liberalism, black social democracy, and black 
feminism have linkage of varying cohesion with the other African-American 
ideologies save black conservatism.  Black conservatism, the most isolated of 
the six, has only a moderate linkage with community nationalism.  By contrast, 
community nationalism is the least isolated, having linkages of varying 
strength with the other five black ideologies.  Radical egalitarianism and black 
social democracy have ties of varying strength with all other ideological 
groups save black conservatism, and black feminism and disillusioned 
liberalism have connections with three of the black political ideologies, but do 
not have ties with each other or with black conservatism.375 
At the level of community support, Dawson reports that disillusioned 
liberalism and black nationalism, followed by black Marxism, have the 
greatest number of true believers.  Black conservatism has the least.  On the 
other hand, black conservatism has far and away the largest number of “true 
haters.”376  These results largely mirror the degree to which a particular 
ideology has links, or ties, to other black political ideologies.  Black 
conservatism has the fewest links and the lowest level of black popular 
support.377 
It is now possible to evaluate the encounter between Judge Higginbotham 
and his three critics as a political discourse.  The Civil Rights Macro-Narrative 
clearly falls within the parameters of radical egalitarianism, as Parts II and III 
of this article hinted.  The Narrative emphasizes struggle and protest, as does 
the activism of radical egalitarians.  Judge Higginbotham flayed Thomas for 
having a pinched and narrow conception of equality, for forgetting where he 
came from, and for hurting black interests.378  Radical egalitarianism has fallen 
on hard times, however.  “The ‘victory’ of radical egalitarians in public 
opinion polls, while substantial, misrepresents their ability to shape the 
contours of black politics. . . . Liberalism has become a weak force in shaping 
the politics of the black community, even though a large percentage of blacks 
support the radical egalitarian program.”379  Nonetheless, the struggle for civil 
rights matters for black people.  It is noteworthy that community nationalism, 
perhaps now the dominant African-American political ideology, supports 
affirmative action and other antidiscrimination programs.380 
By contrast, the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative expresses the core 
principles and tenets of black conservatism.  However, black conservatism has 
subdivided into two groups, one that has criticized white conservatives for 
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taking a “harsh, antiblack turn,” and one that remains “staunchly libertarian,” 
with nary a complaint about white conservatives.381  Of this second group, 
Dawson writes: “Of the latter we can reasonably ask if there is anything 
distinguishably ‘black’ about their conservatism.”382  Given its extravagant 
praise of Jefferson, Lincoln, and the first Justice Harlan, the Counter-Narrative 
more properly reflects the second subgroup, not the first.  One can only 
imagine how few African-Americans support the political ideology that gives 
meaning and shape to the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.383 
Thus, Higginbotham has the numbers on his side.  He also has the weight 
of history and tradition with him.  Whatever the present difficulties besetting 
radical egalitarianism might be, it sits at or near the middle of black 
experience.  It is outflanked, to one degree or another, by disillusioned 
liberalism, black social democracy, and some forms of black nationalism, 
black feminism, and, of course, it is outflanked on the right by African-
American conservatism.  Thus, Judge Higginbotham also has the philosophical 
core, or center, of black thought on his side.384 
Dawson provides critical insight into the constituent elements of that core, 
or center.  As noted above, for blacks, the community counts as much as the 
individual.385  Thus, “[g]roup-based racial politics have developed historically 
to such a degree that many African Americans’ political preferences are shaped 
by the belief that their individual life chances are linked to the fate of the 
race.”386  The core, or center, also holds no brief for American democracy; 
“with the exception of black conservatism, all black ideologies contest the 
view that democracy in America, while flawed, is fundamentally good.”387  
The larger principle that generates the foregoing views is that unlike white 
American political ideologies, black ideologies “all claim to have been 
developed out of the historical experiences of African Americans.”388  The 
point cannot be overemphasized, black political ideologies do not rest in 
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sterile, formalistic abstractions but rather in concrete experience.  They link 
“theory and practice.”389  Thus, “[c]oncepts such as equality, freedom, self-
determination, integration, and nationalism have all developed as part of 
attempts by various segments of the African-American community to propose 
strategies for the advancement of black racial interests.”390  Black political 
ideologies, save black conservatism, often parallel or reinforce each other, each 
giving a different emphasis to or stress on particular elements of their macro-
narratives, and thus they have the complex interrelationships discussed 
previously.391 
The fundamental weaknesses of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative now 
appear in stunning fashion.  It is a macro-narrative that rests on sterile, 
formalistic abstractions having nothing whatsoever to do with the historical 
experience of African-Americans.  It fails to link theory and practice if only 
because it reduces African-Americans to mere spectators of a white drama that 
portrays the struggles of white Americans to decide whether their grandiose 
and lofty ideas should in any meaningful way guide their behavior with regard 
to blacks.  While the Counter-Narrative may be a “black” macro-narrative, it 
fails miserably to show that its origins lie in the experience of the black 
community.  It is “black” only because black people—and only a very small 
number or percentage, at that—hold to it.  But that marks the extent, or outer 
limit, of the claim.  It forfeits the core, or center, of black political thought, and 
there are virtually no African-American institutions that adopt, or embrace, 
Thomas’s radical conservatism.  It may represent, therefore, nothing more than 
the cry of an alienated minority of African-Americans, a minority that, at some 
level, simply cannot—or will not—connect with the core, or center, of black 
political thought.392 
Professors Wilson and Kennedy and Thomas’s former law clerk Smith 
overcome neither the numbers nor the force of gravity.  Professor Wilson 
asked us to let Justice Thomas decide for himself what he would make of his 
tenure on the Court.393  None of the black political ideologies, save for black 
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conservatism, would agree that his decision was entirely his affair.  Thus 
Dawson writes, “[p]erhaps the most obvious example of a nonliberal (some 
would say antiliberal) political tradition within black politics has been the 
consistent demand that individual African Americans take political stands that 
are perceived by the community as not harming the black community.”394  
Professor Wilson finds herself, therefore, apart from the center, or core, of 
black political thought. 
Professor Kennedy tries to make more out of the tradition of black 
conservatism than the facts would appear to warrant.395  He cannot move it into 
the core, or center, of black political thought because black people, past and 
present, and probably future as well, simply will not let him do so.  The 
reaction of the former law clerk, now law professor, to Judge Higginbotham’s 
relentless pummeling of Thomas does nothing more than map the sub-strand of 
black conservatism about which Dawson was moved to inquire whether there 
was “anything distinguishably ‘black.’”396 
The political isolation of black conservatives gives one pause.  However, 
every society or culture has its rebels, its misfits, its nonconformists.397  Judge 
Higginbotham accused Justice Thomas of “racial self-hatred.”398  The location 
of black conservatism in African-American political thought suggests that at 
the very least, some black conservatives might find themselves, for whatever 
reason, alienated from the mainstream of black thought, and perhaps even from 
the community itself.  The subdivision in black conservative thought that 
Dawson describes399 might reflect a difference in degree or extent of such 
alienation, with the second group, the one to which Thomas apparently 
belongs, being more removed from the mainstream than the former, less 
libertarian strand of black conservatism. 
Racial self-hatred, of course, can be a reason for alienation.  But alienation, 
rebellion, and nonconformity might have their origins elsewhere in the human 
character, personality, and psyche.  Judge Higginbotham may have been 
correct in his assessment of the source of Justice Thomas’s nonconformity.  
Certainly Thomas’s defenders fail utterly to show that Higginbotham was 
wrong.  However, it suffices merely to show the fact of alienation, rebellion, 
and nonconformity.  The intellectual dishonesty of the Counter-Narrative and 
the isolation of Thomas’s radical libertarian black conservatism make the case.  
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The question remains, however, whether misfits can become heroes and not 
merely pariahs, and, if so, to whom.  More specifically, the question at hand is 
whether Clarence Thomas is or can be a hero to African-Americans.  It is to 
this issue that this article now turns in the next two Parts. 
V.  CLARENCE THOMAS IN HIS OWN WORDS: A FURTHER EXPLORATION OF 
NONCONFORMITY, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTH 
We first encountered Justice Thomas’s voice as he gave expression to the 
Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.  It was an impersonal voice, offering up no 
explicit linkages, or connections, to his personal micro-narrative.  It was also a 
voice uttered before he became a member of the Court.  In the years since 
Thomas has been on the Court, he has spoken his story.  He relates his 
narrative differently, however, depending on the race of the audience. 
A. Speaking to African-Americans 
Justice Thomas delivered his most famous speech at the annual meeting of 
the National Bar Association (“NBA”) in the summer of 1998.  The invitation 
to address the NBA generated much controversy, reflecting the negative 
feelings that many African-American lawyers have towards Thomas.400  That 
said, Thomas took the occasion to lay down the gauntlet to his detractors; he 
was going to think for himself, even if his ideas were not “assigned” to him.401  
He was a member of the Court and it was time to move on, for being angry 
with him did not solve any problems.402  He sounded what appeared to be a 
conciliatory note when he said that, because “the problem of race has defied 
simple solutions and that not one of us, not a single one of us can lay claim to 
the solution,”403 it was time for African-Americans to respect themselves and 
each other and “to continue diligently to search for lasting solutions” to the 
problems that confront black people.404  The problem with this proposition is 
that nothing in the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative admits the possibility of 
experimentation, of trial and error, or of compromise.405  Indeed one 
commentator has flatly stated that Thomas is unable “to open his heart, to 
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listen to evidence.”406  The only “search” that Thomas could recognize, 
therefore, would be one leading to the discovery that his macro-narrative and 
the jurisprudential ideas that it comprehends are the only correct ones. 
The speech is suffused with this arrogant cockiness.  Regarding the work 
of the Court, Thomas stated that some of the criticism “is profoundly 
uninformed and unhelpful.  And all too often, uncivil second-guessing is not 
encumbered by the constraints of facts, logic or reasoned analysis.”407  He 
granted the possibility of “thoughtful analytical criticism,”408 but said that the 
nature of the Court’s work “plac[es] a premium on outside scholarship”409 and 
not on personalized, uncivil attacks on the Court or its members that amount to 
little more than “unilateral pronouncements and glib but quotable cliches 
[sic].”410  In other words, his critics should quit carping unless they are 
prepared to engage in outside scholarship that passes Thomas’s muster. 
On the sensitive question of racial identity, Thomas fired back at his 
detractors.  He said: 
I knew who I was [in the early 1970s] and needed no gimmicks to affirm my 
identity.  Nor, might I add, do I need anyone telling me who I am today.  This 
is especially true of the psycho-silliness about forgetting my roots or self-
hatred.  If anything, this shows that some people have too much time on their 
hands.411 
He made the point a second time: “Despite some of the nonsense that has been 
said about me by those who should know better, and so much nonsense, or 
some of which subtracts from the sum total of human knowledge, despite this 
all, I am a man, a black man, an American.”412  And yet again, “what hurts 
more, much more is the amount of time and attention spent on manufactured 
controversies and media sideshows when so many problems cry out for 
constructive attention.”413 
Side by side with the cockiness of a man who knows that he has a lifetime 
appointment to the Court and can say and think whatever he wants and vote 
however he wants, Thomas also displayed a remarkable sense of self-pity.  He 
declared that the controversy surrounding his invitation to speak before the 
NBA was both customary and wearisome, although Thomas quickly rejoined 
that the controversy, although unfortunate, “added little value in the calculus of 
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my decision to be here.”414  In commenting on criticism of the Court, Thomas 
stated: 
I, for one, have been singled out for particularly bilious and venomous 
assaults.  These criticisms, as near as I can tell, and I admit that it is rare that I 
take notice of this calumny, have little to do with any particular opinion, 
though each opinion does provide one more occasion to criticize.  Rather, the 
principal problem seems to be a deeper antecedent offense.  I have no right to 
think the way I do because I’m black.415 
Thomas tried to defend his dissenting opinion in Hudson v. McMillian,416 
relying largely on a disingenuous argument that the injuries sustained by the 
prisoner in that case were not “significant.”417  The self-pity reemerged.  “It 
should be obvious that the criticism of this opinion serves not to present 
counter-arguments, but to discredit and attack me because I’ve deviated from 
the prescribed path.”418  Thomas recounted how, in his earlier days, he had 
been highly critical of two black conservatives.  He continued that “[i]n a twist 
of fate, they are both dear friends today, and the youthful wrath I visited upon 
them is now being visited upon me, though without the youth.”419  Thomas 
stated that he understood “the comforts and security of racial solidarity, 
defensive or otherwise.  Only those who have not been set upon by hatred and 
repelled by rejection fail to understand its attraction.  As I have suggested, I 
have been there.”420  Finally, he declared that it pained him “deeply, or more 
deeply than any of you can imagine to be perceived by so many members of 
my race as doing them harm.”421 
Thomas sought to justify this admixture of arrogance and self-pity by an 
appeal to race and a rejection of racial consciousness or solidarity at the same 
time.  However, he failed in the attempt.  Thomas’s appeal to race centered on 
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  He argued that his death “was 
the final straw in the struggle to retain my vocation to become a Catholic 
priest.  Suddenly, this cataclysmic event ripped me from the moorings of my 
grandparents, my youth and my faith, and catapulted me headlong into the 
abyss that Richard Wright seemed to describe years earlier.”422  He described 
the murder of Dr. King as the “event that shattered my faith in my religion and 
 
 414. Clarence Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, and American: Searching for Real 
Solutions to Racial Hatred, Address before the National Bar Association Convention (July 19, 
1998), at http://www.douglassarchives.org/thom_b30.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 1998). 
 415. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 710. 
 416. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 417. Thomas, supra note 401, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, at 710. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 711. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 711–12. 
 422. Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 708–09. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER? YES 391 
my country.”423  Many of us were crushed by the death of Dr. King, and the 
Justice has managed to strike a note of solidarity.  Thomas explained that: 
[He,] along with many blacks, found ways to protest and try to change the 
treatment we received in this country.  Perhaps my passion for Richard Wright 
novels was affecting me.  Perhaps it was listening too intently to Nina Simone.  
Perhaps, like Bigger Thomas, I was being consumed by the circumstances in 
which I found myself, circumstances that I saw as responding only to race.424 
The Justice continued, stating that his “feelings were reaffirmed during the 
summer of 1968.”425  Thomas explained: 
[He] closed out the ‘60s as one angry young man waiting on the revolution that 
I was certain would soon come.  I saw no way out.  I . . . felt the deep chronic 
agony of anomie and alienation.  All seemed to be defined by race.  We 
became a reaction to the “man,” his ominous reflection.426 
Thomas described his role in the struggle.  “In college . . . [w]e427 started 
the Black Students Union.  We protested.  We worked in the Free Breakfast 
Program.  We would walk out of school in the winter of 1969 in protest.”428  
However, a demonstration in 1970 “to ‘free the political prisoners’”429 jolted 
Thomas.  It shattered his worldview because he now saw not a struggle for 
freedom, but a struggle between intellect and “fighting much like a brute,”430 a 
“battle between passion and reason.”431  He did not then embrace black 
conservatism,432 but listening to Marvin Gaye’s What’s Going On?, Thomas 
struggled with what he saw as a “road to destruction [that] was paved with 
anger, resentment and rage.”433 
Thomas never seems to have understood that one could resist struggle 
given over to opportunistic, immoral, and illegitimate purposes without 
resisting struggle.  The misdirection of the struggle for the rights of African-
Americans that so jolted the Justice did not mean that one needed to abandon 
struggle altogether.  Similarly, alienation from bad struggle does not 
necessarily warrant alienation from struggle altogether.  It is as if Thomas 
could only see that to “relieve[] . . . the anger and the animosity that ate at [his] 
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soul,”434 he had to strike out in a radically different direction.435  That new 
direction for Thomas pointed him toward the Color-Blindness Macro-
Narrative.  “I did not want to hate any more, and I had to stop before it totally 
consumed me.  I had to make a fundamental choice.  Do I believe in the 
principles of this country or not?  After such angst, I concluded that I did.”436  
Thomas thus abandoned any racial solidarity or consciousness whatsoever.  
Nevertheless, he insisted that his “history is not unlike that of many blacks 
from the deep South,”437 as if to claim that his journey was not a solitary one, 
and as if to insist that he was not alienated from black people as such.  This 
article strongly suggests that if his journey were not solitary, he had precious 
little company along the way.438 
Thomas’s rejection of racial consciousness might have its origins in his 
struggle with the content of his soul, as he suggested.  But he persistently 
overstated and misstated the meaning and content of racial consciousness.  He 
set the stage for the inquiry into the legitimacy of the idea of racial 
consciousness with an interesting use of pronouns.  He stated in his address to 
the NBA: 
While we once celebrated those things that we had in common with our fellow 
citizens who did not share our race, so many now are triumphal about our 
differences, finding little, if anything, in common.  Indeed, some go so far as to 
all but define each of us by our race and establish the range of our thinking and 
our opinions, if not our deeds by our color.439 
Thomas avoided the need to indicate just how many African-Americans are 
comprehended in “many” and “some.”  In any event, Thomas failed to 
consider the possibility that if black people see his votes on the Court as doing 
harm to black people, that they, rather than he, might be right, and that one 
might reasonably take offense to such gratuitous injuries.  Nowhere did 
Thomas engage the question in a serious, thoughtful and “connected” way.  He 
merely declaimed that he is “confident that the individual approach, not the 
group approach, is the better, more acceptable, more supportable, and less 
dangerous one.  This approach is also consistent with the underlying principles 
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of this country and the guarantees of freedom through government by 
consent.”440  Thomas had insisted that critics of the Court should proceed in “a 
thoughtful analytical” fashion.441  However, he saw no need to respond to his 
critics in the black community in such a manner.  Apparently, it is enough 
merely for him to declare what he believes is better for black people and move 
on.  So speaks one with power who is alienated from those to whom he speaks.  
So speaks the alienated victim who perpetuates the alienation of others by 
lending support to the environment that harms them.442 
Thomas came closest to the truth of the African-American existential 
reality when he correctly observed that “[w]e were all black.  But that 
similarity did not mask the richness of our differences.”443  Nonetheless, he got 
it all wrong when he declared that “[t]oday . . . it is customary to collapse, if 
not overwrite, our individual characteristics into new, but now acceptable 
stereotypes.”444  The moral claim made by the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative is 
not that black people fit some stereotype, but rather that black people recognize 
that they have obligations to each other, as members of a community engaged 
in a struggle, to gain for themselves and for others who have been left out, 
ignored, or otherwise dismissed, the promises made to all Americans.  Thomas 
made a categorical mistake, therefore, when he confused obligation with 
stereotype.  Thomas sought to conflate alienation with mere difference.  It was 
enough for him to declare that he was a different kind of black man and leave 
it at that. 
Given Thomas’s position as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, 
the large theme of alienation running through Thomas’s remarks received an 
interesting treatment in his discussion of the interpersonal dynamics within the 
Court, as he saw them, and he then used them to rationalize his alienation from 
black people.  Justice Thomas referred to the Court as “a model of civility.”445  
Unkind words are not spoken there, even though the Court has had “many 
contentious issues” come before it.446  This civility is remarkably impersonal, 
however, drenched in alienation.  He stated: 
One of the interesting surprises is the virtual isolation, even within the court.  It 
is quite rare that the members of the court see each other during those periods 
when we’re not sitting or when we’re not in conference.  And the most regular 
contact beyond those two formal events are the lunches we have on conference 
and court days.447 
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Thomas then shifted to a discussion of his own views as a Justice.  The 
impersonal isolation that he had just described forms a backdrop to his claim 
that given that isolation, he is perfectly free to follow his own ideas and to 
think for himself.  The Justice bridled at the notion that he “couldn’t possibly 
think for [himself].”448  He dismissed the suggestion that he was being led by 
the white reactionaries on the Court because some believed, apparently, that 
nothing else “could possibly be the explanation when [he] fail[ed] to follow the 
jurisprudential, ideological and intellectual, if not anti-intellectual, prescription 
assigned to blacks.”449 
B. Speaking to Others 
Michael Dawson notes that black conservatives characteristically hold up 
white norms while denigrating black norms.450  Thomas’s speech before the 
National Bar Association trashed black norms.  The articles and speeches that 
he prepared for white audiences reveal the kowtowing to whites that Dawson 
describes.  The Justice’s speeches and articles express two major themes, both 
of which play to the goals and sensitivities of the most reactionary whites.  The 
first is the ascription to both himself and his grandfather of the status of heroes.  
The second concerns a theory of responsibility.  Thomas expressed four 
subsidiary themes that build to one degree or another on the first two.  The first 
subsidiary theme is his reaffirmation of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative.  
The second subsidiary theme constitutes a criticism of American law schools.  
The third and fourth subsidiary themes, mirroring elements of his speech to the 
National Bar Association, are his overwrought self-pity and his notion of the 
“civility” at the High Court. 
Thomas repeatedly makes the audacious claim that both he and his 
grandfather are heroes, and if that were not enough, he resents the fact that the 
world today does not view them as such.  With regard to his grandfather, 
Thomas does so explicitly.451  As to himself, the Justice is a bit more 
circumspect, but one cannot mistake his meaning and intention as he ties 
himself to the virtues that, in Thomas’s mind, made his grandfather a hero.  He 
stated: 
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My grandfather would be an anachronism in today’s world.  He would be 
looked upon as an insensitive brute.  I know that many view me that way.  This 
is quite odd since, without groveling or begging, he maintained his dignity 
even in a world that was hell bent on denying it.  And, he did all he could to 
preserve his freedom and to provide the tools for his family and those around 
him to secure and maintain theirs. . . . It would seem to me that those are the 
things of legends and heroes. . . .452 
In speeches to children, Thomas offers himself “as living proof that hardships 
can be overcome without the help of government,”453 again linking himself to 
the virtues that lead him to call his grandfather a hero.454 
Thomas ties this non-recognition of his true nature and that of his 
grandfather to “the rise of radical egalitarianism.”455  The second theme picks 
up the thread.  Thomas often referred to the following saying of his 
grandfather’s: “Old man can’t is dead; I helped bury him.”456  By this his 
grandfather rejected victimhood, no matter how hard his life might have been.  
“[T]here was much that my family and my community did to reinforce this 
message of self-determination and self-worth, thereby inoculating us against 
the victim plague that was highly contagious in the hot, humid climate of 
segregation.”457  “But today,” Thomas complained, “our culture is far less 
likely to raise up heroes than it is to exalt victims,”458 all because of the 
emergence of a new political ideology “[b]etween the New Deal and the 
1960s”459 that held that the role of the state was to eliminate want, and thus, 
encourage those who were in need to “identify themselves as victims and make 
demands on the political systems for special status and entitlements.”460  By 
contrast, the methodology and structure of the common law, a system of which 
Thomas approves, “traditionally required that redress for grievances only be 
granted after very exacting standards had been met.  There had to be, for 
example, very distinct, individualized harm.”461  Thus, “[v]ery generalized 
claims of misfortune or oppression or neglect—the kinds of assertions made in 
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the political system—would not easily fit into this common mold of court 
activity.”462 
With these two themes, Thomas has touched all of the bases with 
conservative and reactionary whites.  Even the bold assertion of heroism 
essentially tells his audience that they were right to trust him to be a reliable, 
dependable, right-wing reactionary Supreme Court Justice.  He was not going 
to let them down, not at the cost or risk of losing his self-proclaimed status of 
being a hero.  He let it be known that he would not look with favor on 
government welfare programs that cut against what he understood to be the 
grain of the common law.463  He might just as well have said that he subscribed 
to the agenda of the right wing, Republican Party.  No alienation here—at least 
not from reactionary whites. 
At least two difficulties arise from Thomas’s assertions, however.  First, in 
these speeches and articles, Thomas chooses to minimize, if not outright 
ignore, the role that his grandfather played in bankrolling the local chapter of 
the NAACP during a particularly troubling time in the early 1960s.464  That 
would put the Justice’s audience on edge.465  Second, given the relegation of 
African-Americans by the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative to the mere role 
of passive onlookers, Thomas’s declaration that he and his grandfather are 
heroes suggests either that the Counter-Narrative is false, or that the Justice 
and his grandfather were rather special black people, not connected to the mass 
of African-Americans, who, after all are mere spectators, not the stuff out of 
which heroes are made.  Of course his grandfather was more connected than 
the Justice was prepared to allow.  Thomas, on the other hand, was not, and 
Thomas, not his grandfather, sits on the Court.  The ultimate irony, of course, 
is that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative would reckon Thomas’s grandfather a 
hero, his rugged individualism notwithstanding.  His grandfather’s support of 
the Civil Rights struggle at a time when it was dangerous to do so guarantees 
that result.  This calls into question Thomas’s silly claim that the black 
community, or at least large chunks of it, seek to enforce a rigid ideological 
purity.  Finally, one must ask why Thomas chose not to share his views on 
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heroism in his family with the National Bar Association.  Perhaps too many in 
that audience knew or might have known of his grandfather’s role in the Civil 
Rights struggle, thus undermining what little credibility Thomas has with 
African-Americans. 
The subsidiary themes elaborate on the fundamental premise of the two 
major themes: Clarence Thomas is a hero, the grandson of a hero, and one who 
elevates the concept of individual accountability and responsibility to the level 
of first principle, thus accounting the Justice as a faithful, reliable, and durable 
acolyte of a white reactionary agenda. 
Thomas first stated the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative as a disciplined 
intellectual proposition in an article in the Howard University Law Journal.466  
In his speech to the National Bar Association, he laid out the ultimate 
conclusion of the Counter-Narrative—that racial consciousness was 
unacceptable and contrary to the ideals of the founders of the nation.467  He did 
not, on that latter occasion, lay out the argument in support of his conclusion.  
Since his accession to the Court, Thomas has, however, restated the intellectual 
premises of the Counter-Narrative in a speech later published in a law 
review.468  In another speech, also later published, Thomas mounted an attack 
on some of the top or elite law schools, arguing that they “neglect to teach that 
law is an art, a craft, and not an adjunct to fancy theories or a means for 
political and social revolution.”469  He continued to charge that law school 
graduates “are often shocked to learn that much of the law is already settled, 
and that it is their job only to apply it to the new set of facts before them.  In 
other words, law practice requires the common law method our law schools 
once emphasized.”470  Here, Thomas is building on his accountability theme in 
which he argued that the radical individualism of the common law, and its 
emphasis on the particular case, was the normatively proper conception of the 
role of the law in adjudicating disputes.471  Not surprisingly, he concluded that 
“scholarship has grown far distant from the needs and concerns of the Bar and 
the Bench.”472  Thomas framed the problem in such a way so as to make it 
perfectly clear that law as social engineering, the jurisprudence of Charles 
Hamilton Houston,473 and the jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Macro-
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Narrative,474 is simply misguided.  His view is evidenced by the following 
statement: 
I believe that the decline in American legal education has occurred due to a 
loss of mission, a loss of purpose among lawyers, judges and professors alike.  
We have come to see law as a means and not as an end.  Some among us see 
law only as a tool to achieve various political and social goals, whether they be 
redistribution of income or the emancipation of certain groups that have 
allegedly been oppressed by the rich and the powerful.  Others view the law as 
a tool to achieve a client’s goals, as a weapon with which to win at any cost.  
And many, no doubt, look upon the law as a vehicle for personal wealth and 
power or as a way to make money—at least as much money as an investment 
banker without taking as many risks.475 
Civil rights lawyers, like Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, 
are, for the Justice, merely a variation on the theme of radical, unprincipled, 
money-grubbing lawyers, while, presumably, conservatives and reactionaries 
understand that “[c]entral to [the] vision of law and democracy is a rule of law 
as a set of clear rules that are neutral and applicable to all.”476  The claim that 
there is any such thing as “neutrality” is, in and of itself, anything but 
neutral.477  Thomas has done nothing more than recast, in somewhat different 
form, his colorblindness principle, putting a more explicitly formalist spin on 
it.  Making sure that he appeals to the sensibilities of white reactionaries, 
Thomas is quick to claim that “[a]s lawyers, we cannot constantly question and 
attempt to modify legal rules in order to allow the underdog or the overdog to 
win.”478  One is irresistibly reminded of Anatole France’s dictum that the law 
in its majestic equality forbids both rich man and poor man alike to sleep under 
bridges.479  Thomas’s mission is to bring aid and comfort to the reactionary 
forces, and here he has admirably succeeded. 
With regard to self-pity, Thomas outdoes himself when speaking to whites.  
He even compares himself to Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, as the Justice 
resisted the promptings, presumably from African-Americans, to change his 
now reactionary views.480  How his white audience might react to this 
outrageous remark is perhaps unclear.  It is my sense, however, that black 
people would have booed him off the stage if he had attempted that 
comparison in a black setting.  Self-pity seems so deeply ingrained in 
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Thomas’s character, that he will use it in speeches aimed at both blacks and 
reactionary whites.  Perhaps he clings to the image of heroism as much as he 
does to counteract or compensate for his deeply etched sense of victimhood, 
even as he seeks continually to deny the legitimacy of victimology.481  The 
fuller implications of heroism and victimhood in the African-American 
experience will be explored more fully in the next section of this article. 
In his remarks before the National Bar Association, Thomas used his 
conception of the civility that he found on the Court, in part, to justify his 
radical individualism and alienation from the large majority of African-
Americans.482  In his earliest remarks to white audiences, Thomas stated that 
“[s]ix of the nine of us enjoy lunch together during the term.”483  By 1998, 
Thomas painted the picture of civility rather differently, one much colder and 
impersonal: “[W]e simply do not see each other on a frequent basis . . . . For 
the most part, we will only see each other when we have conferences, a formal 
event, or when we sit.  There is rarely contact beyond that.”484  Again, Thomas 
used this description of life at the Court to reassure his audience that he will 
not be contaminated by the views of any Justices who might march to a more 
moderate, not to say liberal, or progressive, drummer.  He has gotten to his 
position on his own, he has no intention of abandoning it, and he will continue 
to vote in accordance with his reactionary ideology while on the Court.  Here, 
the point is not to challenge or taunt, as was the case in his remarks before the 
National Bar Association, but to reassure and empathize with reactionary 
whites. 
Thomas’s ideological allegiance lies with reactionary whites.  Black 
people need to get used to that fact.  Whatever form alienation might take for 
Thomas regarding his fellow Justices on the Court, there will be no ideological 
alienation from reactionary whites.  As for African-Americans, there is 
alienation, not only ideological, but more profoundly psychological. 
We see, therefore, in Thomas’s remarks to both African-Americans and to 
non-African-Americans, two forms of alienation.  The one that pertains to 
African-Americans, however, is far more serious, severe, and total.  Thomas 
fits the profile of black conservatives in that he seeks, in spite of his deeply 
ingrained sense of alienation, to make common cause with reactionary whites 
at the level of ideology and public policy, and through his voice and votes on 
the Court.  He will do the work of white reactionaries, no matter the nature, 
character, and form of his alienation, and he wants to ensure that nobody 
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misses that fact.  No other reading of his articles and speeches as a Justice is 
plausible. 
Dramatic evidence of the foregoing was reported recently.  In a speech 
before the Savannah Bar Association, Thomas broke down and wept while 
talking about his decision to take custody of his grandnephew.  “It was an 
awkward few minutes before Thomas could continue.  As Thomas wept, a 
lawyer from the back of the dining room called out to him, ‘You’re home.’  
Applause broke out . . . . It was an extraordinary moment . . . [because of] the 
mainly white Savannah establishment’s embrace of its hometown hero.”485  
Forget Pin Point, Georgia, that poor black town down the road from Savannah.  
In every meaningful sense of the word, Thomas was “home” in the company of 
a white, conservative, if not reactionary, small-town, southern bar. 
VI.  LOCATING CLARENCE THOMAS IN THE WORLD OF HARRIET BEECHER 
STOWE’S UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 
The initial reaction of antebellum African-Americans to Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin was, on the surface, enthusiastic, because the novel served as an 
important antislavery weapon.486  However, enthusiasm quickly gave way to 
dismay, anger, and rage.487  African-American criticism of the novel has 
remained unrelenting and severe.  Almost a century after the novel appeared, 
James Baldwin wrote the definitive African-American critique of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin.  He called it “a very bad novel, having, in its self-righteous, virtuous 
sentimentality, much in common with Little Women.  Sentimentality, the 
ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of 
dishonesty, the inability to feel. . . .”488  He reflected earlier black unhappiness 
with the novel, stating that the “book was not intended to do anything more 
than prove that slavery was wrong; was, in fact, perfectly horrible.”489  
Regarding the title character, Uncle Tom, Baldwin, in what surely must be 
seen as overstatement, declared him to be the only black man in the novel, but, 
closer to the mark, stated that he “has been robbed of his humanity and 
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divested of his sex.490  It is the price for that darkness with which he has been 
branded.”491  Because Stowe was driven, on account of the institution of 
slavery, by a “panic of being hurled into the flames, of being caught in traffic 
with the devil,”492 the book, in Baldwin’s view, was “activated by what might 
be called a theological terror, the terror of damnation.”493  As a literary work, a 
protest novel, the failure of the book “lies in its rejection of life, the human 
being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insistence that it is his 
categorization alone which is real and which cannot be transcended.”494  Uncle 
Tom, therefore, was not a human being, a flesh and blood figure, but merely a 
formal category. 
As stunning as Baldwin’s attack on Uncle Tom’s Cabin may be, Sarah 
Smith Ducksworth went him one better.  She attended, in much more icy, 
clinical detail, to the racism that suffuses the novel.  She noted, as Baldwin and 
others before him had correctly observed, that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
motives, her real concern, involved white salvation.495  Again, following 
Baldwin, Ducksworth argued that “[s]lave types appear in the novel just as 
stiffly drawn as their white counterparts, but unlike those of the white 
stereotypes, their roles are functional rather than prescriptive.”496  Thus, she 
continued, “[d]epictions of blacks’ faults create for whites a greater 
understanding of and appreciation for the innate good qualities of their race, 
which they must nurture to a level of excellence in preparation for the hour of 
manifest destiny.”497  She now ratcheted up the attack on the novel.  The slave 
characters were merely “stick figures,”498 and were “figments of a white 
cultural imagination.”499  She stated that “Stowe does, in fact, use African 
types to model ‘alien’ behavior that flies in the face of ‘civilized’ white 
behavior.”500  The flaw in the novel, as it relates to the African-American 
characters, went beyond the denial of Uncle Tom’s humanity and the 
divestment of his sex, as Baldwin had argued, but “reveal[ed] slaves as both 
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foils for and inversions of their white counterparts.  They appear as distorted 
mirror images of whites, painted in various shades of bronze and ebony, acting 
black according to their degree of tint.”501 
Ducksworth then offered a particularly devastating example of her thesis, a 
comparison of Pete and Mose, Uncle Tom’s two boys, with the two white boys 
in the Bird family of southern Ohio.  Stowe depicted Pete and Mose as 
boisterous and incorrigible.502  But “[m]ore indicative of [their] inferior natures 
than their irrational behavior is their inability to reason abstractly and to 
project into the future.  Stowe reveals their mental and emotional shallowness 
by juxtaposing their father’s forced departure from home against the boys’ 
preoccupation with breakfast.”503  They “remain dry-eyed until they actually 
see their father being led away by the slave trader.  Only at that moment do 
they cling to Chloe’s skirts, ‘sobbing and groaning vehemently.’”504  Too little, 
too late, Ducksworth declared.505  The two white boys, by contrast, 
demonstrated all of the morally and culturally proper responses, processed 
information, and showed proper remorse and mending of their ways in the face 
of the great tragedy of the escaped slave, Eliza, and her son, Harry.506 
Ducksworth analyzed the nature and character of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
racism.  While Uncle Tom may have been a Christ figure,507 “Stowe sees no 
contradiction to her theory that even though racial inequality is real in the 
secular sphere, perfect racial equality is not impossible in the spiritual 
sphere.”508  Thus Stowe, an evangelical Protestant, had merely recast or 
reshaped the dualist theology that so dominates her religion,509 in contrast with 
another, undoubtedly more popular, dualist construct that would use race—
white versus black—as the sole criterion for judging status and worth both on 
earth and in heaven.  But, neither construct offered anything for African-
Americans in this world.  The only difference was whether there is anything 
for African-Americans in the next world. 
Ducksworth then showed that Stowe treated her mulattoes differently from 
her black characters like Uncle Tom.  “The mulattoes’ dilemma in America, as 
Stowe conceives it, is to be superior to unmixed blacks, but always to be 
doomed by ‘the impress of the despised race upon [their] . . . face[s].’”510  
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White blood created a “better” breed of black people, but black blood, 
nonetheless, doomed it.  Stowe’s view bears a marked similarity to the 
Afrikaner view of Africans and Coloreds.511  Ducksworth concluded by 
placing Stowe’s racist views in a broad historical context.  She stated: 
By linking her antislavery position to her conviction of racial inequality, Stowe 
articulated the hope and belief of great numbers of whites who evidently felt as 
burdened as the writer by the sinful weight of slavery.  Stowe’s vision of a new 
world order offered them a perfect way to attain their manifest destiny and to 
control the host of lowly Africans in their midst.512 
Ducksworth had carefully traced the nature and character of black objections to 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  She noted, of particular relevance here, that “history 
shows that even in the wake of appreciation for Stowe’s antislavery support, 
the portrayal of a passive Uncle Tom was problematic for blacks who believed 
that every human being’s highest duty is to resist the tyranny of oppression.”513  
She had placed the persistent and enduring black criticism of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin squarely in the matrix of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative, a narrative 
that places heavy emphasis on black moral and physical protest.514  She stated: 
As blacks moved further away from the days of chains and shackles, and as 
they became more empowered by their hard-won social and political gains, the 
seething disdain for Uncle Tom as a character grew into open declarations of 
hostility against Stowe’s entire novel and its whole cast of darky 
stereotypes.515 
One can reasonably ask whether any good, then, can possibly come from a 
bad, dishonest, and racist novel, its antislavery position notwithstanding.  
Ducksworth offered one answer: 
[The book], viewed as a cultural product, may be useful as a cautionary tale to 
help students recognize not only how truly self-deceiving the concept of a 
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“degraded other” can be, but also, on a larger scale, how collective self-images 
enhanced beyond reason and laws of nature perpetrate social injustice against 
those with the least power to protect themselves.516 
She was, one fears, too generous and kind.  She begged the question to be 
decided, whether collective self-images have, in fact, been “enhanced beyond 
reason and laws of nature.”  It may not be possible to teach the novel in the 
way that she would like, given the self-deception of far too many Americans 
when it comes to the matter of race. 
Another use of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, both more limited and more radical—
although far less harmful to black interests, however—does present itself.  
African-Americans can “revise, renarrate, correct, speak back to the novel in 
order to restore the dignity and humanity that the novel so often denies . . . 
[African-Americans].”517  To see it, the analysis of Pete and Mose has to be 
revisited.  They certainly come across as unlikable characters but for one 
important fact.  Their insouciance, their self-centeredness, and their lack of 
feeling in the face of their father’s impending departure have a sad and 
sorrowful explanation, having nothing to do with the supposedly innate, 
essentialist characteristic or qualities of African-Americans that Pete and Mose 
embodied.  Mr. Shelby, the supposedly “good” Kentucky owner of Uncle Tom 
and his family, including the two little boys, Pete and Mose, sold Uncle Tom.  
This is one of those stubborn facts that will not go away.  The comparison of 
Uncle Tom’s two sons with the Birds’ sons collapses if one takes into account 
the evil inherent in Mr. Shelby’s ownership of other human beings.  The two 
white boys had no Mr. Shelby in their lives.  Stowe repeatedly railed against 
the institution of slavery,518 so surely she must have intended for her readers to 
recognize this fact.  Her emphasis, of course, lay with white feelings, white 
sensibilities, and white salvation.519  However, that stubborn fact does not keep 
readers from reconstructing the text in ways that will allow for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the African-American characters, whether or 
not Stowe meant for readers to.  Stick characters, mere formalist 
characterizations, can be reconstituted as flesh and blood human beings, 
complete with the beauty, dread, and power to which Baldwin summoned 
us.520  Readers have merely but to use their powers to make it happen. 
If one turns to the stubborn fact of the “good” Mr. Shelby, the truth 
emerges.  Given the reality of the forced separation of black families because 
of the financial or other exigencies or whims of white slave owners, it made 
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perfect sense for Uncle Tom and his wife, Chloe, to teach their sons that the 
continued existence of their African-American family was beyond their 
control, that separation at any time was always a possibility, and that 
survivorship required Pete and Mose to steel their emotions and to cope with 
fortuitous disaster.  It is reasonable to assume that the parents so instructed 
their children.  We now understand perfectly their behavior at the forced 
departure of their father.  One need not care for the lesson—and one should 
not—in order to appreciate its practical power.  It has something of the quality 
of Sophie’s choice.521  Uncle Tom and Chloe were dealt a very bad hand and 
they played it the best way that they could, under the circumstances.  African-
Americans might still be recovering from the lesson, from a constricted range 
of choices that robbed them of too much of their beauty, dread, and power.  
But, the cure requires African-Americans to understand the lessons of history 
and to understand the practical problems that confronted Uncle Tom, Chloe, 
and all of their African-American slave ancestors.  One need not have to 
celebrate the lesson taught to Pete and Mose to understand it, to assess it, and 
to swear never to have to teach it again.  Indeed, the sad story of Pete and 
Mose provides a justification for the struggle that lies at the heart of the Civil 
Rights Macro-Narrative—save the children! 
The adherents of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative would point to 
Shelby’s son, George, the “color blind” white man who, having succeeded to 
his father, offered to manumit his slaves.  There are problems with this 
position, however.  As an initial matter, he could not save Uncle Tom.  He 
could not save him or his family, as family.  He tried, but it was too late.  
Furthermore, George could only offer a kind of serfdom, a system of free labor 
as opposed to unfree labor, but menial labor nonetheless.522  He cannot liberate 
his black slaves—former slaves-to-be—from the shackles of peasantry.  
Whether George believed in the racial equality that Harriet Beecher Stowe so 
stoutly resisted, remains an interesting but open question.  George Shelby was 
swimming against the tide.  Not only did Stowe prove the point, but so did 
history. 
Pete and Mose might, as literary characters, evince Stowe’s racism.  But a 
deeper truth about those two characters, mined and shaped through the prism 
of the black struggle, is that the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative stands.  There 
are other truths in Uncle Tom’s Cabin about black people whether or not 
Harriet Beecher Stowe had any interest in them.  Those truths help us 
understand the relation of Justice Clarence Thomas to African-American 
communities, and it is to them that this article now turns. 
 
 521. WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Random House 1979) (1925). 
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A. Uncle Tom 
Judge Higginbotham contemptuously referred to Justice Clarence Thomas 
as an Uncle Tom.523  But in this regard, he was surely wrong, if one means the 
character drawn by Harriet Beecher Stowe.  Following is the first introduction 
to Uncle Tom through the words of his owner, Shelby: 
Tom is a good, steady, sensible, pious fellow.  He got religion at a camp-
meeting, four years ago; and I believe he really did get it.  I’ve trusted him, 
since then, with everything I have,—money, house horses,—and let him come 
and go round the country; and I always found him true and square in 
everything.524 
Notwithstanding such high praise, Shelby agreed to sell Uncle Tom, who is 
married to Aunt Chloe and has three children, including Pete and Mose, to a 
slave trader in order to settle a debt.525  Haley, the slave trader, wants more, 
and Shelby agrees to let him have Harry, the child of Eliza, another slave on 
Shelby’s farm.526 
Eliza overhears a conversation between Shelby and his wife in which he 
describes his transaction with the slave trader.  Eliza promptly decides to take 
Harry and escape.  Before she leaves the farm, she lets Uncle Tom and Aunt 
Chloe know of her plans.  His wife encourages Uncle Tom to flee as well,527 
but he rejects her advice.  His reasoning matters; it was better that he be sold 
off than all of the slaves on the farm be sold off.  He has not let his master 
down before and he will not do so now even to save himself.528  One can read 
this to say that Uncle Tom has set the agenda of his white owner over that of 
his own people, not to mention himself.  However, the moral calculus points in 
another direction, Tom declines to flee in order to save other black people in 
general, and his wife and children in particular, even at the cost of his own 
position, indeed, as it turns out, his life.  Thus, Uncle Tom was a “selfless, 
stoical, fatalistic martyr” and not a racial traitor.529  When he later remonstrates 
with his wife and fellow slaves, who were speculating or hoping that Haley 
would go to Hell, and says that they ought to pray for him,530 Tom was not 
abandoning his people, but merely trying to understand the world through the 
prism, or lens, of a suffering servant.531 
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Again, in the parting scene with Aunt Chloe when he is turned over to the 
slave trader, Tom again makes the point that everything is in the Lord’s hands 
and that it is only he that has been sold, not her or their children.  She does not 
see things that way, and Uncle Tom chides her.532  And so, “Tom rose up 
meekly, to follow his new master, and raised up his heavy box on his shoulder.  
His wife took the baby in her arms to go with him to the wagon, and the 
children, still crying, trailed on behind.”533  Tom left a rather strong 
impression, he “had been looked up to, both as a head servant and a Christian 
teacher, . . . and there was much honest sympathy and grief about him, 
particularly among the women.”534 
But the suffering servant, this Christ figure,535 was not wholly self-
emptying.  He had a powerful sense of what was realistic and practical.  
Shortly after Tom begins his trip South to his final destiny, Shelby’s son, 
George, happens by chance upon the slave trader’s party.  George declares to 
Uncle Tom that he wants to “blow [Haley] up! it would do me good!”536  To 
which Tom replied, “No, don’t, Mas’r George, for it won’t do me any 
good.’”537  Uncle Tom’s decision not to escape with Eliza and Harry was 
rooted in a communitarian ethic of the sort described by Michael Dawson as 
typical of African-Americans.538  Now, Tom revealed something of an 
individualistic streak—he was concerned with what was best for him, not his 
wife or the other slaves on Shelby’s farm.  However, time and time again, 
Tom’s sense of what was best for him largely involved the hereafter, the next 
world, as his desperate condition as a slave on Legree’s forlorn Louisiana 
plantation, far away from his family and his native Kentucky, ineluctably took 
hold. 
As the novel unfolds, we see Uncle Tom, the suffering servant, befriending 
the lonely and the outcast, bringing aid and comfort whenever he could.  We 
also see him cultivating relationships with powerful whites, including the 
saccharine Evangeline St. Clare.  But these relationships enable him to pursue 
his objectives, both communitarian and individualistic, the conversion of 
African-Americans to his evangelical Protestant faith.539 
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All of this comes to a head at the end of the novel.  Uncle Tom has been 
sold by the racist and self-absorbed widow of Augustine St. Clare, the dandy 
and fop who betrayed Uncle Tom by failing to manumit him, when he had the 
chance to do so, to the brutish Simon Legree.540  Arriving at Legree’s 
plantation, deep in Louisiana bayou country, Tom discovers his mission, and 
his doom.  Legree’s slaves were a brutalized lot.541  But, Uncle Tom’s 
character is too strongly formed for him to give in, performing acts of 
charity,542 much to the consternation and displeasure of the ever-watchful 
Legree.543  Tom refuses Legree’s order to flog an elderly slave woman.544  In 
response, Legree beats Uncle Tom, then turns the job of beating Tom over to 
Sambo and Quimbo, Legree’s black henchmen.545 
Tom explains his actions to Cassy, a slave and former mistress of Legree’s, 
who comes to Tom’s aid after the brutal assault by Legree, Quimbo, and 
Sambo.  Uncle Tom tells her that he does not want to lose heaven, having lost 
everything on earth.546  Legree’s field hands come under Tom’s sway as Uncle 
Tom continued his conversion work in earnest.  They would gather to hear him 
speak of Jesus.547  Meanwhile Cassy wants Tom to kill Legree, whom she has 
drugged, and make his escape with her and another young slave girl, 
Emmeline.  Tom, the suffering servant refuses, but he does encourage Cassy 
and Emmeline to escape.  He, once again, refuses to join in an escape.  He has 
found his final work among Legree’s field hands and thus will stay until the 
dreadful end.548 
Tom refused to run away with Eliza and Harry because Shelby would have 
to sell off many if not most of the slaves on his farm.  Such an eventuality 
would cause great damage and harm to other black people—in this world.  
Now, Tom refuses to run away with Cassy and Emmeline because his work of 
conversion on Legree’s plantation has not yet been finished.  If he did make his 
escape this would cause great damage and harm to other black people—this 
time in the next world.  The end comes swiftly.  Cassy and Emmeline make 
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good their escape, plotting and executing a particularly ingenious plan.  Legree 
correctly surmises that Tom knew of the plan.  He confronts Uncle Tom and 
Tom defies Legree one last time, admitting that he knew of the plans but 
refuses to divulge them.549  Tom’s destruction swiftly follows at the hands of 
Legree, Quimbo, and Sambo.550 
Uncle Tom’s rejections of offers of escape form the two bookends, or 
brackets, of a personal agenda and commitment to black people, even at the 
cost of his own life.  The suffering servant surely does not battle like the 
avenging angel, the other important figure or icon in a larger metaphor.551  But 
the suffering servant and the avenging angel are but two sides of the same 
coin: the ideology of messianism,552 a macro-narrative, a belief that a group 
(Africans-Americans in this instance) has “a manifest destiny or a God-given 
role to assert the providential goals of history and to bring about the kingdom 
of God on earth.”553  The suffering servant, Uncle Tom, and the avenging 
angel, Nat Turner, are the conjoined micro-narratives of black messianism.554 
Black messianism finds powerful expression in the Civil Rights Macro-
Narrative.  It makes sense to see movement lawyers like Charles Hamilton 
Houston and Thurgood Marshall as both suffering servants and avenging 
angels operating within the confines of an institutional legal system that seeks 
to wring passion and emotion out of conflicts and battles, making them cases 
and controversies instead.555  But black messianism does not operate in the 
Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative, celebrating, as it does, various and sundry 
white racists.  And by reducing African-Americans to mere observers, Justice 
Clarence Thomas has denied both the African-American suffering servant and 
the black avenging angel even as, in his grandiose self-pity, he offers himself 
as both. 
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At the level of micro-narratives, it is difficult to see Justice Clarence 
Thomas as a suffering servant.556  The only advantage or benefit that he has 
given up in pursuit of what he sees as good for African-Americans is 
popularity in the black community,557 a mere trifle in comparison with the 
sacrifices made by Uncle Tom.  Furthermore, the Justice appears to have 
complained more about this supposed burden than Uncle Tom ever complained 
about his far more substantial cross.  Indeed, Justice Clarence Thomas, 
possessed of an arrogance that perhaps knows no meaningful limitation, resorts 
to an entirely different metaphor to describe himself—the hero,558 not the 
suffering servant.  It remains eerily possible, however, that the Justice sees 
himself as an avenging angel bent on wreaking destruction not on errant 
whites, but on black people.  The avenging angel is merely an expression of 
the victimized victimizer. 
B. Sam and Sambo 
Judge Higginbotham, therefore, made a categorical error in denouncing 
Justice Clarence Thomas as an Uncle Tom.  But the mistake is understandable.  
The suffering servant macro-narrative became distorted.  It became an element 
in a macro-narrative in which black people were “naturally servile.”559  But, 
when the suffering servant is wrenched away from a creative dynamic with the 
avenging angel, and thus with messianism, distortion inevitably follows.560  If 
Justice Clarence Thomas is no Uncle Tom, no suffering servant, the question 
remains whether the Justice might still be found in Stowe’s sprawling novel.  
On this point, two slave characters warrant examination: Sam and Sambo.  One 
writer has noted Stowe’s use of names to describe both reflective and 
refractive interracial images.561  Thus, there are two characters named Tom, 
two named George, and two named Henry, one black and one white.  
However, Stowe’s choice of the names “Sam” and “Sambo” might suggest that 
Stowe had some rather different structural or literary relation in mind between 
the two slaves.  Because “Sam” and “Sambo” are not exactly the same name, 
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and because both characters are African-American, the relation between the 
two necessarily differs from the linkages between the Toms, the Georges, and 
the Henrys.  Stowe does compare and contrast Sam and Sambo, and it is in the 
comparison, a study in alienation and social isolation and in conservatism, that 
we can see the proper location of Clarence Thomas in the world of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin. 
When Eliza flees with her son, Harry, Shelby is faced with a dilemma.  His 
improvident business decisions had necessitated the sale of Uncle Tom and 
Harry to the loathsome slave trader, Haley.  But Shelby has to show his good 
faith with Haley by helping Haley capture the escaped slaves.  Shelby’s wife, 
however, has no such compunctions, having no involvement in her husband’s 
poor business decisions and having quite an attachment to Eliza.  And thereby 
hangs the tale. 
The sale of Uncle Tom and the escape of Eliza and Harry become the talk 
of the farm.  Sam, a slave given to “a strict lookout to his own personal well-
being,”562 entertained thoughts of succeeding Tom as Shelby’s head slave.  He 
had little time to mourn the sale of Uncle Tom.563  Sam, and another slave, 
Andy, are asked by Shelby to accompany Haley on the chase, as Andy puts it, 
“to look arter” Eliza.564  Sam immediately pops off at the mouth, bragging 
about how he is the man to catch Eliza and Harry.565  Andy, whose role or 
function, is to keep Sam honest, points out that Mrs. Shelby does not want 
them caught.566  Sam appreciates the reality of the situation, and he and Andy 
manage to thwart Haley by a string of clever ruses and stratagems.  Eliza and 
Harry make it across the Ohio River, but just barely.567 
Sam and Andy return to the Shelby farm, their story to relate.  Mrs. Shelby 
hears them approach and Sam tells her that Eliza is “clar ‘cross Jordan.”568  
Shelby joins his wife, and Sam describes the desperate flight across the ice 
floes in the river.569  Sam makes sure to tell the Shelbys that the escape would 
have failed but for his efforts.  In effect, he seeks to establish his value to his 
owner.570  Of Sam, Stowe wrote, “Master Sam had a native talent that might, 
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undoubtedly, have raised him to eminence in political life,—a talent of making 
capital out of everything that turned up, to be invested for his own especial 
praise and glory. . . .”571  Taking his leave upon Mrs. Shelby’s orders for him 
to go to the kitchen to get something to eat, Sam declares, “I’ll speechify these 
yer niggers . . . now I’ve got a chance.  Lord, I’ll reel it off to make ‘em 
stare!”572  The scene shifts to the kitchen, which by now was full of Sam’s 
fellow slaves.  “Now was Sam’s hour of glory.  The story of the day was 
rehearsed, with all kinds of ornament and varnishing which might be necessary 
to heighten its effect. . . .”573  Sam, like any good politician, concludes with a 
ringing declaration of his intention to stand for the rights of his fellow 
slaves.574  Andy, Sam’s conscience, reminds him, in the presence of the others, 
that only that morning Sam had said that he would help catch Eliza.575  Sam 
responds with the best piece of rhetoric in the entire novel.  In a masterful 
display of doubletalk and gobbledygook, Sam proceeds to convert his 
hypocrisy, which Andy had perhaps not so innocently unmasked, into a claim 
of conscience and principle—persistence.576 
The striking feature of Sam’s tour de force is his deeply felt need to stay in 
the good graces of the community of slaves on Shelby’s farm.  Sam is a 
hypocrite and a self-promoter, as Andy and Aunt Chloe (who does not much 
care for Sam)577 well know, and his principle of “persistence” betrays the truth 
of his character to any perceptive listener.  But he knows that he has no future 
apart from that community.  Given the reality and the constraints of the 
institution of slavery, he cannot survive alienated or socially isolated from 
black people.  He has to make his peace with both Andy and Aunt Chloe, and 
he makes an effort to do so.  At the end of the novel Shelby’s son, George, 
now the owner of the farm, manumits his slaves.578  Sam does not make an 
appearance in this scene, however.  One is left to wonder whether Sam, with 
freedom papers in hand, would have left the farm and the slave community to 
make his own way in the world.  But it is equally likely that Sam would have 
remained on the farm as a worker, not a slave, and continued to cast his lot 
with the black community there. 
Not so with Justice Clarence Thomas.  He is a hypocrite—an “affirmative 
action baby” who opposes affirmative action.  On this score he matches up 
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rather nicely with Sam.  Similarly, like Sam and even like Uncle Tom, the 
Justice seeks to cultivate good relations with powerful whites.  But he parts 
company with both Sam and Uncle Tom in his rejection of community with 
African-Americans.  His remarks to the National Bar Association bear no 
resemblance to Sam’s spiel in the kitchen on the night of his triumphal return 
from a mission to thwart the slave trader.  For Justice Thomas, the struggles of 
the black community for equal rights justify his decision to abandon that 
community and its norms in order to pursue his highly idiosyncratic and 
dubious notions of what is good for African-Americans, if, indeed, that good is 
a matter of concern at all for the Justice.  Justice Clarence Thomas certainly 
stands for the principle of persistence, but for Thomas, the principle operates to 
alienate and separate, not to reconcile or bring together.  In his speech, Justice 
Thomas essentially said that he was who he was and his listeners had better get 
used to that fact.  An African-American wielding a considerable amount of 
power as a sitting Justice on the Court tells other African-Americans to take it 
or leave it. 
In Sambo and in his mirror and foil, Quimbo, we find precisely the same 
dynamic: African-American henchmen, or overseers, for an evil slave owner 
telling their fellow slaves to take it or leave it.  We first meet Sambo as Legree 
returns to his plantation with a new batch of slaves, Uncle Tom among them.  
Harriet Beecher Stowe wasted little time in setting out the fundamental social 
dynamic between Sambo, Quimbo, the other slaves on Legree’s plantation, and 
Legree.  Sambo and Quimbo “were the two principal hands on the plantation.  
Legree had trained them in savageness and brutality as systematically as he 
had his bull-dogs; and, by long practice in hardness and cruelty, brought their 
whole nature to about the same range of capacities.”579  The novelist 
continued: 
  Legree, . . . governed his plantation by a sort of resolution of forces.  
Sambo and Quimbo cordially hated each other; the plantation hands, one and 
all, cordially hated them; and, by playing off one against another, he was pretty 
sure, through one or the other of the three parties, to get informed of whatever 
was on foot in the place. 
  Nobody can live entirely without social intercourse; and Legree 
encouraged his two black satellites to a kind of coarse familiarity with him,—a 
familiarity, however, at any moment liable to get one or the other of them into 
trouble; for, on the slightest provocation, one of them always stood ready, at a 
nod, to be a minister of his vengeance on the other.580 
What transpires, ending with the death of Uncle Tom, is the working out of 
this cruel minuet of alienation and social isolation.  In the midst of this utter 
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desolation, Uncle Tom does his work, seeking to build community through 
conversion and good works. 
Sambo is, at least for the nonce, untouched.  He continues to treat the other 
slaves owned by Legree with an admixture of cruelty and callous disregard.  In 
one particularly brutal scene, Sambo kicked a slave woman named Lucy that 
Uncle Tom had helped by taking cotton from his sack and transferring it to 
hers.  The woman fainted from the blow and Sambo revived her by sticking a 
pin in her flesh.  The woman came to and resumed work as best she could.581  
Uncle Tom continued to add cotton to her sack, much to the consternation of 
Sambo who complained to Legree of Uncle Tom’s acts of kindness towards 
Lucy.582  Legree came up with the idea of having Uncle Tom whip Lucy, 
causing Sambo and Quimbo to break out laughing.583  Later on, he refuses 
Legree’s orders, defiantly telling Legree that Legree does not own the 
suffering servant’s soul.  Legree immediately orders Sambo and Quimbo to 
give him a beating.  Stowe writes, “The two gigantic negroes that now laid 
hold of Tom, with fiendish exultation in their faces, might have formed no 
unapt personification of the powers of darkness. . . . [T]hey dragged [Uncle 
Tom] unresisting from the place.”584 
While beating Uncle Tom, Sambo discovered that Uncle Tom had, among 
other mementos, a lock of the hair of Evangeline, the doomed daughter of his 
previous owner in New Orleans, Augustine St. Clare.  Sambo promptly takes 
the hair to Legree, claiming that it was “a witch thing.”585  Legree reacts with 
fear and alarm, asking Sambo why he had brought the hair to him.  
Admonished, Sambo dutifully takes his leave of Legree.586  Still upset about 
the hair because it reminded him of his own mother, Legree first seeks relief 
and solace from his dogs.  Then he decides to have Sambo and Quimbo sing 
and dance for him.  Stowe writes, “Legree was often wont, when in a gracious 
humor, to get these two worthies into his sitting-room, and, after warming 
them up with whiskey, amuse himself by setting them to singing, dancing, or 
fighting, as the humor took him.”587  And so it goes with the three of them 
carousing “in a state of furious intoxication” into the wee hours of the 
morning.588 
Legree notices a change in Uncle Tom.  Sambo wonders if he is going to 
run away.  Sambo is quick to assure Legree, in much the same way that Sam 
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had assured Shelby, that he would catch Uncle Tom if he tried to run away.589  
Matters come to a head, Cassy and Emmeline have escaped, and Uncle Tom 
admits to Legree that he knew of the plans but refuses to tell anything.590  The 
destruction of Uncle Tom commences at the hand of Legree, and Sambo and 
Quimbo join in.591  The two slaves come to regret their role in the mortal 
beating of Uncle Tom and he forgives them.592  Sambo is converted, asking 
Jesus to have mercy on him.  Uncle Tom asks God to give him the souls of 
Sambo and Quimbo, and his prayer was answered.593 
Unfortunately, Justice Clarence Thomas and unregenerate Sambo have 
much in common.  No one could accuse the Justice of being physically brutal 
to black people or to anybody else, for that matter.  But he seems to have 
condoned physical brutality when visited upon prison inmates.594  The prison 
systems in more than a few American jurisdictions bear an uncanny 
resemblance to Legree’s plantation in that they are monuments to alienation 
and social isolation.  Not surprisingly, violence seems to accompany that 
state,595 and Justice Thomas is markedly insensitive to it.  It is not enough to 
claim that inmates have violated the moral duty to take responsibility for their 
actions, as Justice Thomas does,596 because the right question is whether it 
satisfies the goals and objectives of the criminal law to deprive criminals of 
their freedom and to subject them to a harsh—but not violent—prison regime. 
Beyond the question of violence, the similarities are striking.  The unsaved 
Sambo has no community with Quimbo, the other slaves, or Legree.  Unlike 
Sam, the rascal and hypocrite, Sambo sees no need to form one.  Here the 
literary relation between Sam and Sambo now becomes clear.  Both are studies 
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authorities is sufficiently offensive to warrant the appellation “cruel and unusual.”  Thomas 
necessarily trivialized the harm done to the inmate in this case, although he tried to avoid this 
implication.  See Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, supra note 401, at 710 
(insisting on maintaining a rigid distinction between law and morality).  He just does not get it.  
Robbing the Constitution of moral content undermines not only the Constitution itself, but it also 
undermines the claim of the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative that certain value-laden principles 
of equality informed the Constitution.  If these principles have no moral content, then it is hard to 
see just how they can mean very much, at least in the face of, or in opposition to, the overtly 
moral claims of the Civil Rights Macro-Narrative. 
 595. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harvest Books 1973) (1951). 
 596. See Thomas, Freedom, supra note 451 passim. 
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in alienation, the difference being that Sam recognizes, in ways that Sambo 
does not, or cannot, that alienation from other blacks is dear.  Sam seeks to 
make community, notwithstanding his hypocrisy, whereas Sambo makes no 
such attempt before his conversion to Christ by the mortally wounded Uncle 
Tom. 
Justice Clarence Thomas makes efforts at being in community with other 
African- Americans.  But he seems almost invariably to come up short.597  And 
the reason has everything to do with his exaltation of white racists like Thomas 
Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln and his put-down of blacks who have fought 
for civil rights.598  The unsaved Sambo cannot make community with his 
fellow slaves on Legree’s plantation because of the nature of his relations with 
Legree.599  Indeed, he cannot even make community with Quimbo, his foil, 
mirror, conscience, rival, and nemesis.  Thomas cannot make community 
because of the nature of his relations with racist whites, both living and 
dead.600 
 
 597. For a stunning and damning discussion of Clarence Thomas’s relations with black 
people, see Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 
4, 2002, at 8, 8–12, 24, 26–28 (describing a man who: (1) causes black people to call him an 
“Uncle Tom” to his face; (2) the “mere mention of [his name] often prompts emotional reactions 
at barbershops, cocktail receptions, gyms, anywhere African Americans congregate;” (3) leads 
essayist Debra Dickerson to describe him as a “lonely guy;” (4) dares to address the outgoing 
president of the National Bar Association, a black man, as “bruh” only to generate a negative 
response that Thomas was being hypocritical; (5) hangs with the white guys, ignoring a group of 
black men at an event at the Greenbrier Resort in West Virginia; (6) gets omitted from Ebony 
magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential blacks; (7) leads black members of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii to resign because Thomas had been invited to 
participate in a debate on affirmative action; (8) leads black people to suggest that he “suffers 
from a twisted hatred of his own blackness;” (9) generates a sustained hostile reaction to a gift 
from a white real estate developer to name a public library after Justice Thomas, resulting in a 
compromise solution of a gift of $150,000 “in exchange for naming a wing of the library” after 
Thomas because the black leaders in Savannah, Georgia, did not want to have Thomas “held up 
as a role model;” (10) becomes estranged even from his “heroic” grandfather because Thomas did 
not return “to Savannah to practice law and use his good education to help other blacks;” (11) 
turns a meeting with the then president of the National Bar Association into a social disaster when 
Thomas declares “that he often advises students not to take African American and women’s 
studies courses” and proceeds to suggest that “the dearth of black law clerks was attributable less 
to race and more to class, a point that bothered [the NBA president];” (12) even obliges his friend, 
Donna Brazile, to concede that Thomas “is not looking to be a black leader;” (13) leads a friend 
from childhood days to call Thomas “a turncoat who has forgotten where he came from,” and 
(14) has done nothing to help his all-black hometown of Pin Point, Georgia). 
 598. See supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text. 
 599. One is left to wonder whether the saved Sambo can continue his relations with Legree or 
whether they must come to a violent and even deadly end.  Clarence Thomas, of course, has not 
been saved at all, at least not in the sense that Harriet Beecher Stowe intends. 
 600. Clarence Thomas made a spectacle of himself when he presided at Rush Limbaugh’s 
wedding.  See Tony Mauro, High Court Highs and Lows, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at 9.  
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Many black conservatives have managed to maintain relations with the 
African-American community.601  Therefore, the question is not whether 
Justice Clarence Thomas is a conservative of one sort or another, but whether 
he is socially isolated from black people, and if so, to what extent or degree.  
Both Sam and Sambo are black conservatives,602 but they relate entirely 
differently to the African-American communities in which they find 
themselves.  Tension clearly exists between black conservatism, particularly in 
the form espoused by Sambo, and the black community,603 and undoubtedly 
always will.  Again, what matters is how the tension is worked out through 
interpersonal dynamics, and whether alienation and social isolation become the 
dominant characteristics or traits of those dynamics. 
This conclusion necessarily follows: In the world of Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Clarence Thomas is no Uncle Tom.  He is no 
Sam.  But surely he is an unredeemed Sambo. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: A BRIEF NOTE ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
This paper has shown why Justice Clarence Thomas is a pariah in the 
African-American community.  “Justice Thomas, it seems, is trying to run 
away from his own biography and history—in a word, from ‘himself.’”604  
Certain large implications follow from this fact, not the least of which is that 
one must concede that the black man sitting on the Court is deeply and 
profoundly alienated from large numbers of, if not the vast majority of, 
African-Americans.605  One cannot honestly claim, therefore, that black people 
 
Unfortunately for Clarence Thomas, Limbaugh’s racist credentials have been exposed.  See 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER’S EGG 42–56 (1995) (describing Limbaugh as a racist 
hatemonger).  One sees an uncanny similarity between this sorry spectacle and the sight of 
Legree, Sambo, and Quimbo carousing in a drunken stupor. 
 601. See generally Eisenstadt, supra note 103. 
 602. Sam and Sambo exhibit the fundamental traits or characteristics of black conservatism.  
See id. at x–xi (stating that black conservatives show a “deep-seated respect for the culture and 
institutions of American society and Western civilization, and the related conviction and 
insistence that blacks, through their own resources, can make it within American society,” they 
“place their focus on individual achievement,” and noting that “[m]ost black conservatives are 
anti-Utopian, less interested in constructing an ideal society, than in getting by in the society in 
which they find themselves”).  See also DAWSON, supra note 98, at 282–99. 
 603. See supra notes 375-77 and accompanying text. 
 604. Calmore, supra note 3, at 200. 
 605. A particularly biting and pungent attack on Justice Thomas for his lone, solitary dissent 
in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1048–57 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) nonetheless 
concluded with a powerful reaffirmation of black community, even in the face of Thomas’s war 
on his own people.  Calmore, supra note 3, at 202.  “It would never occur to Thomas that, in the 
end, his Black political enemies and victims have more empathy for him in his sickness than his 
white racist ‘friends’ could ever claim.  They don’t even know him.”  All About Clarence: Self-
loathing on the High Court, BLACK COMMENTATOR, Mar. 6, 2003, at 
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have a representative on the Court, that is to say, a person with whom they feel 
any real sense of community. 
It does not follow that black people are entitled to any such representation, 
although clearly the same could be said of every other ethnic or racial group, 
including white Americans.  But apart from any consideration or analysis of 
group representation political theory, having a Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court who is as alienated and socially isolated from his own people 
as Justice Clarence Thomas is, assuredly raises serious questions about the 
fundamental nature and role of the Court. 
Throughout its history, the Court has largely served as a conservative fly-
wheel, or counterweight, particularly on the question of race.  Dred Scott v. 
Sandford606 and Plessy v. Ferguson,607 horrible decisions though they may be, 
typify the work of the Court.  Brown v. Board of Education,608 to the extent 
that the decision in that case in fact represents a commitment to racial justice, 
equality, and inclusion,609 is a sport, an exception.  The Warren Court has 
come and gone.  A fairly stable conservative majority, of which Justice 
Clarence Thomas is an important part, guarantees that the Court will largely 
continue to function as a counterweight to racial progress and will continue to 
ensure that white hegemony continues in one fashion or another.  Indeed, this 
majority engineered a coup d’état in Bush v. Gore610 in large part to ensure its 
continued existence as the majority on the Court, even though the decision 
clearly harms African-Americans.611  Other futures are possible—the Court 
could come to understand its fundamental purpose differently.  But it is ironic 
that Justice Clarence Thomas’s tenure on the Court will do much to deny those 
futures. 
 
http://www.blackcommentator.com/32/32_commentary_pr.html.  A full treatment of the case is 
beyond the reach of this paper.  However, Thomas clearly assigned less weight or value to the 
undeniably racist practices of the Dallas County District Attorney’s office, inter alia, in 
manipulating the racial composition of juries in the past, and the substantial evidence that such 
practices continued in the instant case.  But Thomas’s dissent is all of a piece with the regrettable 
tendency of black conservatives to celebrate white norms and to denigrate African-American 
norms.  See Eisenstadt, supra note 103, at x–xiii; Tate & Randolph, supra note 383, at 2. 
 606. 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) (1856). 
 607. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 608. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 609. For an argument that Brown does not, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 610. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 611. See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 474 (2001) (arguing that the case harms blacks and others through its 
merit-based vision of democracy as opposed to a more “inclusionary vision of democracy [that] 
values widespread participation and looks to remove criteria or conditions that act as barriers to 
such participation”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] CLARENCE THOMAS, VICTIM? PERHAPS, AND VICTIMIZER? YES 419 
Nothing in Grutter v. Bollinger612 changes this basic conclusion that the 
Court is an impediment to racial progress and justice, including the fact that a 
member of the conservative majority, Justice O’Connor, joined the four 
moderates on the Court to save at least something of affirmative action, finding 
in doctrinal terms, “a compelling state interest in student body diversity.”613  
Undergirding that finding was Justice O’Connor’s reluctance to challenge the 
views of “major American businesses” and “high-ranking retired officers and 
civilian leaders of the United States military” that affirmative action in college 
and university admissions was necessary for business and for national 
security.614  The point of affirmative action, for Justice O’Connor, is not social 
justice, not remediation for past racial discrimination,615 but rather an 
imperative for the ruling classes, which, of course, are overwhelmingly white, 
to perpetuate themselves in a time of growing racial and ethnic diversity.  The 
Court stated: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, 
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.  All members of our 
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of 
the educational institutions that provide this training.616 
Thus white hegemony continues after Grutter, even if it would appear that 
the interests of racial minorities are incidentally helped and not harmed by the 
decision.617  Justice O’Connor concluded with a silly remark that “[w]e expect 
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.”618  She has clearly signaled 
an intention to rein in affirmative action, to get rid of it, just not now, not while 
a war is raging in Iraq, a war being fought disproportionately by American 
soldiers who are not white. 
In assessing the cultural or institutional racial views of the Court, it is a 
matter of no small concern that the four moderates on the Court found little to 
object to in Justice O’Connor’s pinched construction of affirmative action.  
The fact that she essentially elaborated upon Justice Powell’s views in Regents 
 
 612. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
 613. Id. at 2338. 
 614. Id. at 2340. 
 615. See Lawrence, supra note 253. 
 616. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. 
 617. See Bell, supra note 609.  Black people tend to support affirmative action, regardless of 
political ideology.  See DAWSON, supra note 98, at 122, 277, 295, 301 (both Black Nationalists 
and Dr. Martin Luther King, the prototypical radical egalitarian/disillusioned liberal, supported 
affirmative action, and only Black conservatives appear to oppose it, and not even all of them do 
so).  Justice Thomas, of course disagrees that there is any benefit to African-Americans, 
incidental or otherwise, from affirmative action.  See supra notes 245-79 and accompanying text. 
 618. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347. 
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of the University of California v. Bakke619 does not improve the situation, for 
Justice Powell was no progressive on racial issues.  Justices Marshall, 
Brennan, Blackmun, and White were made of stronger stuff, articulating a 
more powerful defense of affirmative action as a remedy for racial 
oppression.620  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, at least, had the presence of mind 
to distance themselves from Justice O’Connor’s inane twenty-five year sunset 
rule.  They stated: 
  It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land. . . . 
  . . . [I]t remains the current reality that many minority students encounter 
markedly inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. . . . From today’s 
vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next 
generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal 
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.621 
And yet, the eight white Justices tend to split evenly most of the time on 
the matter of white hegemony because the four white moderates, more often 
than not, tend to get the race question right.  It is the non-white Justice, the 
alienated black man, Justice Clarence Thomas, who more often than not 
provides the key fifth vote in the cases that defend and maintain white 
hegemony,622 and thus keeps the Court anchored to its large historical mission.  
Justice Clarence Thomas’s narratives of alienation from black people—the 
micro-narrative of his own personal history and experience and the Color-
Blindness Macro-Narrative—become the instruments for the reinforcement, if 
not the reconstruction, of a macro-narrative of white alienation from black 
people, a macro-narrative that has fueled and propelled the Court from the 
beginning, producing micro-narratives—decisions in individual cases—that 
repeatedly trample black interests and concerns.623  Thus, again, it can be fairly 
said that a major goal or function of the Court is alienation of African-
Americans,624 and Justice Clarence Thomas, more often than not, ensures that 
that goal is maintained, enforced, or achieved. 
 
 619. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 620. See id. at 324–408. 
 621. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 622. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (electing George W. Bush, a candidate who 
received a pittance of black votes, President of the United States); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down an affirmative action program); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630 (1993) (striking down a congressional districting plan that produced a majority minority 
district). 
 623. Bush, 531 U.S. 98; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200; Shaw, 509 U.S. 630. 
 624. See Geyer, supra note 4, at xxvii (stating that “objectively alienating conditions remain 
fairly pervasive, especially under the, often, both politically and economically oppressive 
situations . . . among the disadvantaged minorities in the West”). 
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The genius, if such it be, of the first President Bush, was to install on the 
Court an alienated African-American to do the work of reactionary, racist 
whites.  Indeed it is worthy of note that the second Bush in the White House 
might have intended a similar coup, this time with Miguel Estrada, a 
conservative lawyer and immigrant from Honduras.  How stunning it would be 
to have not only an African-American, but also a Latino ensconced on the 
Court, both dedicated to white racial hegemony.  The memory of the first great 
act of duplicity might explain the strong resistance of most of the Democrats in 
the United States Senate to the nomination of Estrada to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), a court 
often seen as a stepping stone to the United States Supreme Court.  It is no 
small irony that this U.S. Circuit Court functioned as a stepping stone for 
Justice Clarence Thomas.  Democrats found the courage to filibuster the 
nomination of Estrada to the D.C. Circuit Court, something that they lacked in 
connection with Justice Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court, and, after 
several unsuccessful attempts to end the filibuster, Estrada withdrew his 
nomination.  The memory of the great act of duplicity by the first President 
Bush might explain why many Latino groups were not blindsided by Estrada’s 
ethnic identity in ways that many African-American groups were blindsided, or 
even duped, in 1991 by Justice Thomas’s ethnic identity.625  Thus the failure of 
the Estrada gambit, might not necessarily produce political benefits for Bush 
among Latino voters. 
And yet, depending upon the circumstances, alienation can be a force for 
good in the world.626  Some people love better from a detached distance than in 
a deep personal relationship, or in less extreme terms, better observe and 
analyze from a distance than from up close.  But alienation too often leads to 
less happy results.627  In an age of culture wars, of close divisions on difficult 
and important social questions, alienation as an ideology or as a personal 
narrative is unhealthy. 
Reconciliation, power sharing, and a search for common ground strike this 
author to be what the country needs.  Justice Clarence Thomas cannot provide 
leadership, guidance, or insight into any of these.  Neither can the other four 
members of the conservative majority on the Court, not even Justice 
O’Connor.  Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and of course Thomas, were 
 
 625. The question whether Estrada is alienated from Latinos, or at least from substantial 
groups or numbers of Americans of Hispanic origin, the way that Thomas is alienated from 
African-Americans lies beyond the reach of this article.  However, a full and complete analysis of 
Miguel Estrada should include the question whether he is an alienated man, both victim and 
victimizer. 
 626. See MONROE, supra note 9, at 2–3 (discussing the virtues of alienation). 
 627. Id. at 3 (distinguishing between strategies of alienation that are antidotes and those that 
are “loveless, paranoid, and pathological”); Bryce-Laporte & Thomas, supra note 10, at 384–85 
(discussing positive and negative alienation). 
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prepared to countenance a virtually all-white leadership class, or elite, because 
racial diversity— and therefore reconciliation—is of no value to them.  The 
Court, therefore, becomes—as it has tended to do throughout our history—a 
large part of the problem, not the solution, even as the presence of Thomas on 
the Court muddies the waters and tends to obscure the racist agenda of the 
conservative majority of the Court, an agenda that traces back to the 
beginnings of this nation. 
The alienation of Justice Clarence Thomas from African-Americans is a 
tragedy and a disaster, both from the macro-narrative perspective of the Court 
and its work, and from the more intimate and personal micro-narrative of 
Justice Thomas’s life.  Surmounting the breach bids fair to be a long and 
difficult process, as this article makes clear, assuming that it can even get 
started.  But the alienation-driven ideology of the Court in matters of race is 
even worse.  If any value can be found in having a latter-day Sambo on the 
Court in the person of Justice Clarence Thomas, if one can see clearly in 
muddied waters, it lies in the deeper realization that Sambo and Simon 
Legree’s heirs on the Court, Justices Scalia628 and Rehnquist629 as well as 
Kennedy630 and even O’Connor,631 are still in charge of the racial business of 
the Court just as Sambo, Quimbo, and Legree combined and conspired to 
degrade, defile, and defame African-Americans.  Harriet Beecher Stowe thus 
exposed and illuminated a terrible truth—the unholy alliance of reactionary, 
racist whites and alienated blacks—the full dimensions of which she could not 
 
 628. See Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the 
Myth of Colorless Individualism, in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1981, 2061 (1993) 
(stating that “Justice Scalia and some of his colleagues aim to achieve the Plessy majority’s 
adjudicative result: absolving America of its racism without changing it” and that “Justice Scalia 
and others attempt to force color-based oppression into white-immigrant models”); Dennis D. 
Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1079 (1994) 
(declaring that “Justice Scalia has frequently been accused of a marked insensitivity to the rights 
of African-Americans”); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: 
The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1530 
(1998) (stating that “[t]he sole source of support for Scalia’s turning a set-aside contract program 
[in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)] into Bull Connor racism is White 
racial ideology of individualism and racial distancing”). 
 629. See supra note 465. 
 630. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Croson, praised Scalia’s racist approach.  See Croson, 
488 U.S. at 518–19 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 631. See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 407 (1989) (stating 
that Justice “Marshall’s charge that [Justice] O’Connor and others have expressed ‘insulting 
judgments’ about black elected officials is a story of racism on the Court” practiced or evinced by 
those Justices).  Justice O’Connor seems to alternate between being an heir of Simon Legree and 
an heir of Augustine St. Clare, the New Orleans dandy who masks his participation in an evil 
régime with a curious admixture of fecklessness, cynicism, and insouciance.  Put differently, she 
sometimes appears to be a kinder, gentler Legree. 
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have foreseen, not because of the future abolition of slavery, but because of her 
own deeply ingrained racism.  At the present, it is precisely that unholy 
alliance that keeps the Court aligned with the ugly tradition of Dred Scott. 
Immeasurably aided by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court, properly 
understood, therefore, is one of the central loci of an alienating environment, 
particularly on the matter of race.  It is not, in any direct physical sense, as 
violent as Legree and his black henchmen were, although one might point to 
the Court’s support of the death penalty632 while at the same time rejecting any 
and all evidence showing the racially disparate impact of that penalty.633  But 
the decisions of the Court on race, over the course of the nation’s history, have 
encouraged the violence of the state, the unofficial militia such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, and most devastatingly, relatively unorganized white racists who, secure 
in the knowledge that the Court supports and endorses their racial views, work 
so hard and effectively to alienate and oppress African-Americans in a myriad 
of ways, day in and day out. 
When Justice Clarence Thomas tells us that his epiphany occurred when he 
realized that he had to accept the views of the nation’s founders,634 Justice 
Thomas established, in a supremely ironic way, his qualifications to sit on a 
Court understood as a source of racial alienation.  Justice Thomas’s alienation 
from African-Americans, in other words, makes him particularly suited to do 
the historical work of the Court on matters of race.635  Justice Clarence Thomas 
is living proof of the claim that an alienated man may be both victim, which 
this author is willing to concede for the sake of argument he may well be, and 
victimizer,636 which Justice Thomas’s record on the Court, resting on rigid 
adherence to the Color-Blindness Macro-Narrative and an estrangement from 
and social isolation regarding black people, sadly demonstrates.  He is guilty of 
 
 632. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 633. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  See also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the 
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1987) (arguing 
that “[t]he belief that our society is gripped by barely constrained, relentless [racial and class] 
warfare. . . has been an underlying theme of the Supreme Court’s work on the death penalty”).  
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s infamous one-paragraph memorandum in which he states his intention to 
uphold the death penalty in the face of the truth that it is administered in a racial manner says it 
all: Better that innocent black people die at the hand of the State than none so die at all.  See 
Dorin, supra note 628.  Scalia’s monstrous evil surely places him on the same plane or level as 
Simon Legree. 
 634. See supra notes 435-38 and accompanying text. 
 635. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 202, 205 (noting that Thomas’s “formal blackness lacks 
social connection and any sense of how racism really operates to frustrate his quixotic gestures of 
black self-sufficiency” and thus he “lives a terribly conflicted life, with blackness and judging 
virtually at war with each other” and that race in a functional sense, is a dominant element in 
identity and race, and as such, “invites ‘crisis’ in Justice Thomas” and has “created social distance 
between him and most other blacks”). 
 636. See Geyer & Heinz, supra note 11, at xxxii. 
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spiritual murder, a crime at least as evil as that of Sambo.637  And sadder still, 
time will tell if this sorry, a sad tale of perfidy, betrayal, ambition, and 
dishonesty will play itself out yet again, in this instance involving other racial 
minority groups, as those bent on maintaining white hegemony seek to draw 
others into a tangled web of deceit and manipulation. 
But ultimately, it is the work of the Court that matters.  A Court that 
alienates, even as it feeds and sustains itself on the victimizing alienation of 
Justice Clarence Thomas, is not a pretty thing to behold.  Neither is Justice 
Clarence Thomas.  But he and the Court form a perfect fit, and “twas more the 
pity.”  Will there ever by a majority on the Court dedicated to a different 
agenda, one that does not seek to maintain white hegemony?  One should not 
hold one’s breath waiting for such a development.  Will righteousness ever fall 
like the rain and will justice ever move like that rolling river? 
 
 
 637. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING 
THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 139 (1997) (referring to “the material and spiritual injuries 
that Clarence Thomas has inflicted on Blacks”); Calmore supra note 3, at 201–02 (stating that 
“Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence and value orientation fail to incorporate the human touch that 
connects humanity” and that “[t]his appears to lead him to engage, perhaps unwittingly, in the 
very form of spirit murder—the generic disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on 
our regard—that private racists adopt” and worse, that “Thomas does not simply provide cover 
for these racists, but he complements them,” for “[r]ather than simply insulating their behavior, he 
advances it” and therefore “[t]his spirit murder is manifested in a variety of ways and the hidden 
costs are great”). 
